FAZLUR RAHMAN'S ISLAMlC PHILOSOPHY (5)

C. The Discourse Surrounding Essence and Existence
In his philosophical writings, Rahman devoted a great deal of space to a discussion
of the discourse surroundhg essence and e~istence.'~H' e paid close attention to the
philosophical formulations of Ibn Srni, holding them to be historically the most important.
This is due to the fact that, in Ibn Sina's treatises, Islamic philosophy had been built and
elaborated into a "full-fledged ~ys tern."'R~a~h man also regarded Ibn SinZysa ttempt to
harmonize Greek rational thought with Islam as original in its conception, making him
"unique not only in Islam but also in the Medieval m est.""^ Rahman also considered Ibn
SinaYsd octrine of Prophecy, in which no attempt was made to deduce the tenet fiom the
Greek concept, to be onginal Islamic idea.160
157~omoef his writings on this topic include: "Essence and Existence in ~vicenna,"
MedaevalmdRena'ssanceStu&~4 (1958): 1-16; "Essence and Existence in Ibn Snà: The Myth
and Reality," Hamdardi'sm'cus4 1 (1981): 3-14; "Avicenna and Orthodox Islam"; "Ibn Sina," in
A Hisory ofMüsIr'm Philosop& vol. l. ed. M. M. Shariff, 48 0-506; n e Philosoop6y ofMdIZ $a&z
"Ibn Sini's Theory of the God-World Relationship," in God and Creation: Ao Ecume~zical
Symposium, eds., D. B. Bumeil and B. McGim (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990),
3 8-52; and his cbIntroduction" to the SefectedLetters of Soaikb amad SirbinaZ
'Tt is true that in some places Rahman criticizes Muslirn philosophers, including Ibn Sin:,
as heavily dependent upon rational activity. In this particular notion on prophecy, however, Rahman
credits him as having an original Islamic idea: ''the aspect of this theory of Prophecy that is closest
and most intimately related to the ethos of historic Islam is its teaching that the Prophet, by virtue
of his office, must fimction as legislator and must found a Commmity-state. This idea as such does
Ibn Sina's central metaphysicd thesis posits the division of reality into contingent
being and Necessary Being. In formulating this doctrine, Ibn S i n E devised the theory of the
distinction between essence and existence. Contemporary scholarship, which exhibits a
wide range of opinions, has begun to question whether Ibn Sina really distinguished
between essence and existence. 16'
There are a number of possible reasons for Rahman's predilection for the debate over
essence-existence, especially Mth respect to Ibn SinZYssy stem. One is that Rahman's view
of the theory of essence and existence "arises out of a desire to formulate a fundamental
distinction between God and created obje~ts."'O~n~ t he one hand, this tenet, a very central
not come fkom Greek philosophy. Although there is much in the whole ancient atmosphere of
thought which links the state-law with religion, the idea of the Prophet as such does not exist in the
Greek tradition. Its more immediate source of inspiration must have been ~slarn" (Rahman,
"Avicenna and Orthodox Islam," 675).
L61~ahrnastna tes that many scholars daim that according to Ibn Sina existence is an
accident. Rahman, on the other hand, argues that for Ibn Sina existence is not something additional
to something that exists. It is true that to some extent Ibn SinZ did treat existence as something
happening to the essence, but not to the thing itself. Rahman regrets the fact that many scholars who
study Ibn Sina did not make any distinction between the essence and the thing itself. He reasons that
this misunderstandhg started with Ibn Rushd, and preserved in the West by St. Thomas Aquinas
(d. 1274) (Rahman, ''Essence and Existence in Ibn a lecture delivered at McGill University's
Institute ofIslamic Studies, April29, 1970, and Rahman, "Essence and Existence in Avicenna," in
Medaeval mdReoaSsmce Studi'es, 3. Rahman firrther argues t hat Ibn Sina's concept of essence and
existence was mainly based on Aristotle's duaiism of form and matter. In the S t agirite's view, form
and matter are complementary, they "combine each other directly and make up one single thing
without needing a third principle." Ibn Sina, however, introduced "a third principIe or an agency
which bestows existence on everything, a fundamental consideration which renders fonn and matter
bath as something potential wk-a-visactual, concrete existence" (Rahman, "Essence and Existence,"
rXamdardIsIamicus, 4). For a discussion of Rahman's opinion on this subject, see n. 157 above.
162~ahma"nE, ssence and Existence in Avicenna," Medaeval and Ren&ssaoce Studes, 11 .
See his other articles on the God-world relationship: "Tbn Sina's Theory of the God-World
Relationship," 38-52, Rahman, "The Eternity of the World and the Heavenly Bodies in Post-
Avicennan Philosophy,"and ccGod-World Relationship in Mulla SadrZ," in Essays 02 IsIiz1221'c
Pbrïosuphy and Science, ed. G. F. Hourani (Albany: SUNY Press, 1975), 222-3 7, and 238-53,
respect ively.
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one to Islamic thought, depicts the true concept of God and His relation to the world. On
the other hand, Rahman believes that the doctrine developed by Muslim philosophers but
f o d a t ed on the basis of Greek precept s has led to anthropomorphism. Now, in Rahman' s
judgment, "the guarantee against any such danger shaü be in Ibn Sina's doctrine of essence
and existence."'" Secondly, he argues that the clarification of te- such as "existence,"
cc essence," and "accident" is very important if we are to avoid confusion over their
app1i~ation.lM~~or e importantly, Rahman believes that in his theory of essence and
existence, fin SnZ solved "the contradiction that seerned to exist between the Greek
philosophic world view and Islamic doctrine of creationisrn," which in turn led hirn to
harmonize philosophy and religion.16s It is safe to conclude, therefore, that in entering the
debate over essence and existence, Rahman sou& to examine the ideas held by certain
Muslim philosophers on these matters in the light of his own methodological approach to
Qur'anic exegesis.
In his extensive introduction to the SelectedLetters of Sbaz'ku Ahmad SU.hi%& for
example, Rahman discusses some Greek and Muslim philosophers' concepts of essence and
existence. He begins by examining Aristotle and Plotinus on this subject. Anstotle's
argument for God's existence was based on the eternity of movement and change. In view
of the constancy of change, therefore, a principle was needed on which to ground the
phenornena of life. In Anstotle's thought, this principle is the Unmoved Mover. Change
163~ahrna"nIb, n Sina," 48 1-2.
lm~ahrnan'?, bn Sina," 486.
165~ahma"nI,s lamic Philosophy," 222.
also possesses "as yet unfùlnlled but unrealisable possibilities, i.e. potentialities." In
Rahman's understanding, therefore, Aristotle's God must be a necessary Being, Le. actual
and unchangeable. '66
Plotinus, on the other hand, developed the theory of emanation in which everything
flows fiom the One by stages, mtil it reaches the material reahn. However, he stresses that
in the emanation process, "the higher [ the source] remains complete and within itself and
does not flow into the lower [the efnuent]." Similarly, c'whïle the effluent flows out of the
source, the latter does not give itself, either tot ally or even partly, to the former. The world,
therefore, owes its existence to God but is not a part of Kim." This doctrine has been
termed "dynamic pantheism." Rahman concludes that this Plotinian doctrine of emanation
is an attempt to bridge pure philosophical thought with the religious doctrine linking God
to human beings.I6'
Rahman believes that the doctrine of a God-world relationship developed by Muslim
philosophers, especially that of Ibn Sini, was a synthesis of the dore-mentioned doctrines.
Based on his objection to the absolute dualism of Aristotle, on the one hand, and the
pantheism of Plot inus on the O ther, Ibn Sina developed his own individual concept: "God
'%ahman, cïntroduction," 1. Rahman argues that even though Aristotle shared the opinion
of Mulla S adrG and Ibn Sirnaon being or existence as the primary concept acquired by the mind, the
doctrine of "the primacy of existence over essence," which distinguishes between existence in the
external world and existence as a general concept, is not Aristotle's but developed after Ibn Sina's
time (Rahman, "The God-World Relationship in Mulla Sadr&" 238). See also Rahman, "The
Etemity of the World," 238.
167~ahmacnc,I ntroducito n," 2-3. See also Rahman, "The Eternity of the World," 23 8-9.
58
is, then, the simple, necessary Being whose essence is e~istence."'R~a~h man argues that the
o a h o d ~ xsc holastics of Islam, especiaiiy Fakhr al-DTm al-RZ, also rejected the distinction
behueen the two, based on their beiief that philosophical doctrine is dangerous because "it
afnrmed eternal essences besides the etemal God." Suhrawardi, on the other hand, accepted
the distinction between essence and existence but only on the mental le~e1.'~I'n terestingiy,
Sirhinoi's early statement pointed to God's essence as absolute Being, in the sense that
"nothing can be predicated of God." He argued that it cm be said 'God is Being' but not
'God exists'." He called this level the "level of primordiality [as&]" or "implicitness
[~m4."T1h7e 0qu estion which he posited here is "How could there a ï s e fiom pure Being
and immixed good, non-being and evil?" Rahman asserts that Sirhindi came to recognize
this problem and changed his mind, stating that "Gad is beyond both being and non-being
168~ahman"I,n troduction," 7. Rahman argues that Ibn Sini is the f3st philosopher to
formulate explicitly Yhe concept of contingency in order to introduce a radical distinction between
God and the worid." The concept of contingeocy is perceived by Ibn Sina as an exact response to
the relïgious demand that it is impossible for God and the world to exist at the same level of being
(Rahman, "Ibn Sixla's Theory of the God-World Relationship," 38). This article gives a detailed
expIanation on how Ibn Sina arrived at this argument and what are its implications. Goodman
maintains that fkom a historical point of view c'Avicema's synthesis did not hold up, at least not in
the form he gave it. The reason for its uItirnate fdure of wïdespread acceptance was the same as the
reason for its philosophic/scientific reputability in its more immediate inteuectual environment, the
fact that it was coupled with a rejection of the world's temporal creation" (Goodman, Avzkema
London and New York: Routledge, 1992,108]).
''%ahman argues that Suhrawad's thought is a critical interpretation of Ibn Snâ based
on the Zoroastrian tenninology of Light and Darkness. Suhrauwdi himself, while accepting the
difference between essence and existence at the mental level, "rejects it as a drsfi17ctio ia re: 'It is
not admissible to Say that existence in reau'ty is additional to essence on the ground tbat we can
conceive the essence witliout existence; for [in this case] even the existence is understood -e.g. the
existence of the "Anq&as such [Le. as conceptual existence], but we do not know whether it exists
in actuality'" (Rahman, cTntroduction," 10-1 1). See also Rahman, "The Eternity of the World," 227.
59
which take rise at the same tirne.""' He quotes Sirhindi: "The Being of God is beyond this
being and non-being; just as non-being has no place there, sirnilarly being has no
admittance. For, how can a being which is opposed by a non-being, be worthy of His
~ a j e s t ~ . " ' ~ ~
Rahman appears to concur with Ibn Sina's concept of essence and existence. While
it may be tme that the theory of emanation could "destroy the necessary and dl-important
gulf beîween the Creator and the creation and lead to a downright pantheistic world-view,"
he nevertheless argues that Ibn Sina's theory of essence and existence c m o t mislead one
into adopting such a view since it is "designed to fulfil equally both religious and rational
x~eeds.''~~~
D. Conclusion
Rahman's approach to the history of Islamic philosophy, in which histotical
criticism plays an enhanced role, cm be gleaned fiom his Qur'anic methodology. From this
starting point, he develops the view that to assess a particular intellectual trend, one must
be aware of the time and place in which the philosopher lived. Rahman concludes that
philosophy in Islam did not cease after the death of Averroes, pointing to the intellectual
trends which subsequently emerged in the Islamic world.
In applying his historical approach, Rahman distinguished himself from other
ahman man, "Introduction," 4 1.
17'~ahnian", Introduction," 41.
173~ahma'a?b, n Sini," 482.
60
thinkers such as Mehdi Ha'ïri Yazdi. HaYirpi laced heavy emphasis on the importance of
knowledge by presence as a major distinguishing factor in Islamic philosophy. Rahman, on
the other hand, applied his definition of Islamic phiIosophy as an approach to the study of
history. One example of this approach was his criticism of Muslim philosophers who
adhered to the ccdouble-truth" view, which assirnilates reügious truth to intellectual tmt h,
as deficient in their reügious conviction. This is not to suggest that Rahman in any way
diminished the Muslim philosophers' contribution to the development of human thought.
The above discussion reveals Rahman's ambivalent arguments relating to his view
on the contribution of Muslim philosophers to the intellectual tradition in islam. On the one
hand, Rahman criticizes them, including Ibn Sina, for their heavy reliance on rationalism
which contradicts religious tenets, and for their mistake of assimilating religious tmth to
intellectual truth. This also includes their assimilation of the Prophet to the philosophers,
and Prophetic experience to intellectual cognition. On the other hand, he praises them for
their original contributions, and especially fin Sini for his conception of essence and
existence, a theory which rescues the concept of the relationship between God and the
world fiom anthropomorphic interpretation and, at the same time, provides an answer
designed to satisfy both religious and rational inquiry. The same case cm be made for his
theory of prophecy in which Rahman argues that Ibn Sini proposed an original Islamic
idea. '74
A question can be raised regarding the place of reason in Rahman's view. He assigns
reason an important role by crediting "ra'y" or "personal considered opinion" with
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producing "an immense wealth of Iegal, reiigious and mord ideas dmuig the first century
and a half appr~ximately."~T'~h e Mif tanlites, on the other Iiand, who are usually but
wrongly cailed fkee thinkers, and M u s h philosopbers in generd, corne in for heavy
criticism ftom Rahman. They show strong evidence of Hellenistic influence, which Rahman
regards as antithetical to the spirit of the Qur' Gn.
17'~ahrnan, lslamic Methodology, 14.