FAZLUR RAHMAN'S ISLAMlC PHILOSOPHY (3)

C. Fazlur Rahman and the Character of His Philosophy
One feature of the works of Muslim philosophers which particularly stnkes Rahman
is the blatant neglect of the ethicd dimension in their philosophical treatises? Here
Rahman underscores the need for discussing ethics within the parameters of philosophical
discourse. Nurcholish Madjid and Wan Daud have even alluded to Rahman's unfulfilled
S3~olive"tT, he Development, " 4 1.
M. Abu-Rabic is of a similar opinion on this point and states that the issues of
philosophical thinking in the modern Arab world beIong to a historical and social formation that is
different in nature and complexity than that of the days of alalKindi or al-Firab7 ("Islamic
Philosophical Expression in Modem Arab SocietyyyD er Islam 72 [1995]: 50). For a detailed
discussion on the historical and philosophical background to the ideas of contemporary Muslim
revivalists in the Arab world, with special reference to Sayyid Qufb, see Abu-Rabic hfeflectud
O@s of Isfarmc Resurgeoce in the Modem Arab Wdd (Albany: S UNY Press, 1 996).
"~c tua l l~F,a zlur Rahman himself held a view similar to the above-mentioned scholars to
the effect that Islamic philosophy did not cease to exist with the death of Averroes. Rahman's view
on this subject will be discussed in chapter two.
hope of producing a comprehensive work on Qur'anic ethics?' He did, nonetheless, wrïte
some articles on the t opic, wherein he defines ethics as a theory of moral right and wrong,
for which the guidance (hzd3 of the Quryiin was intended.
Rahman was not convinced that Greek or Persian ethics was necessarily ant agonistic
to the Qur'in. Nevertheless, he asserts the need for a specifically Muslim endeavour to
d e k e the QurY&c ethics, for two reasons: one, Muslims believe that the Qur7& is the
word of God; and second, they believe that the Qur'Zu contains, actudy or potentially,
answers to all the questions that might arise in our daily Iife? To Rahman, therefore, a
science of Islamic mords is possible only when the nature and fimction of man are put "in
the centre of interest," for the Qur% was revealed to human beings for their sake alox~e.~~
It is on the basis of a mord iqerative, he argues, that the future of human enlightenment
must reste6'
Rahman regrets that the religious history of Islam does not yield a systematic mord
philosophy. In his estimation, Muslim philosophers failed to produce a coherent ethical
system, contenting themselves with pure metaphysics and leaving d l practical concems to
''~urcho lish Madjid, "'Fazlur Rahman dan Rekonstruksi Etika al-Qury an (Fazlur Rahman
and the Reconstniction of Qur'bic Ethics)," IrsIarmXa 2 (October-December 1993): 25; Wan Mohd
Nor Wan Daud, 'Tersonal Anecdotes on a Great Scholar Teacher and Friend," Journal of I s 1 . c
Researcb 4,2 (October 1990): 254.
S8~azluRra hman, "Law and Ethics in Islam," in Etfiics in Islam: Ninth Giorgio Levi Della
Vida Biemid Conference, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (Maiibu: Undena Publications, l985), 13-4.
S9~azlu arh m man, 'Tunctional Interdependence of Law and Theology," in Z5eoIogv andLaw
in ed. G. E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971)- 97.
60~azluRra hman, "Avicema and Orthodox Islam: An Interpretative Note on the
Composition of His System," in Nany Austryn WoIfson Jubilee Volume on the Occasion ofHs
Seveoty-fiAh Biifhday, vol. 2 (Jemalem: The American Academy for Jewish Research, 1965), 676.
23
the field of ~ aw.W~ 'h ile works on ethics ('ha l-ak2.E~h)a ve been compiled in Islam, they
repeatedly neglect, based as they are upon Greek or Persian sources, the provisions of the
shari'ah in their cons ide ration^.^^ Modem Western scholad3 account for this tendency by
depicting Muslims as being wary of "producing a rival system of 'do's' and 'don'ts' to the
shdah," and leaving questions of practical moraIity to the latter?
By analyzing three basic tenns used in the Qur' in, Rahman attempts to identiQ the
foundations of a Qur'anic ethics and its characteristic ethos. These three ternis, al1 denved
fiom different roots, are &, isf& and taqwz and express related ideas. The first term,
Lm& cornes fkom the root a-m-n and means "to be at peace with oneself' or "to feel no
tribulation within oneself." In the latter sense, it is equivalent to the term mu!ma'hn,
which means "one who is satisfied within oneself," and both are used equivalently in the
Qur'in 16:112. In its basic meaning, iman, to Rahman, connotes "peace" and "safety," but
in its fourth form, it acquires the attribute of "belief' or "faith" in God, which insures one's
peace and safety. hi&,th erefore, is "an act of the heart, a decisive giving of oneself up to
God and His Message and gaining peace and security and fortification against
tribulati~n."~~
6L~ahmacnc,F unctionaIln terdependence," 94.
62~azIuRra hman, 'Tslamic Studies and the Future of Islam," in IsIamrc Studies: A Tradtion
aodits Problems, ed. Malcolm H. Kerr (Malibu: Undena Publications, 1980), 127.
63~owevehr,e re Rahman does not speciQ whom he means.
65~azluRr ahman, "Some Key Ethicd Concepts of the Qur'k," J o m d ofRe/igious Ethics
1 1 (1 983): 170-1. Izutsu understands the word 7mZ1 as the very centre of the sphere of positive
moral propert ies; see his Ethico-Religious Concepts ui the Qw7& (Montreal: McGiil University
Press, 1966), 184; see especially the chapter "The Beiïever," 184-93. He wrote several treatises
24
Here Rahman identifies two important attributes surrounding fàith. In the fist
insthiice, f&:k is not simply equivalent to intellectual or rational knowledge, but is not
devoid of such knowledge either. Thus, rational knowledge is but one of many components
of faith. Moreover, he States, numerous passages in the Qur'Zn establish this faithhowledge
equivalence, and affkm faith as an attribute which is strengthened by
knowledge. Second, faith is not only a matter of "the heart or heart-and-mind," but must
dso result in action. Rahman holds the separation of the two to be in direct discord with
the QuryZn, leading to "a totally untenable and absurd sit ~ a t i o n . " ~ ~
The second term, isI&, is derived h mth e root s-1-m wàose meaning is "to be
safe," "whole," and "integral." The verbal noun of the fourth form with the definite article,
al-isI&, means "the surrender" or "the genuine sunender." This idea is integral to Tm&:
"the 'surrender' to God's law, in its essential nature, is not possible without faith?'
Interestingly, as noted by Rahman, isl" in some verses of the Qur% is identified with
"God's light" and ccGod's guidance," expressions which are equivalent to the word 7m&.
The point Rahman wishes to make here is that Tm& and islh imply each other, for "an
individual may have some S O o~f T m& but it cannot be true and full Tm2 unless it is
concerning the semantic analysis of some key words in the Qur'Zn, namely, The Concept of M e f
in IsIm'c Theohgy -A Semaotic Analysis of% & and Tslam- (Tokyo: The Keio Inst i t ~e to f
Cultural and Linguist ic S t udies, l965), and God and Mm 19 the Km: Semantics of the Koraoic
WeItmschaumg(To~o:T he Keio fnstitute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1964).
66~ahman"S7o rne Key Et hical," 171 -2.
67 Rahman, "Some Key Ethicd," 172.
25
islamically expressed and worked out through a proper ~ o m m u n i t ~ . " ~ ~
Taqwg the last of the three terms, is, in Rahman's view, the most central ethical
concept in the ~ u r ' i i nH. ~e ~sa ys that when one explores the basic meaning of taqwi?, one
is stmck by the fact that the word has the same sense as the two O thers, Le. ~rniiz and isi".
The root w-q-ymean "to protect" or "to Save fiom destruction," and in the eighth fom of
the verb it means "to protect oneself fiom possible danger or attack," thus, "to be careful."
This word is usually translated as "God-fearingness" or ccpiety."70R ahman argues, however,
that the standard use of taqwZ in the Qur7& is in the moral sense "to guard or protect
against something9'o r '20 protect oneself against the h d l or evil consequences of one's
conduct," thus, "the fear of GodYi7n this sense means "the fear of the consequences of one's
actions." In other words, taqwa "can be effectively conveyed by the term 'conscience,' if
the object of conscience transcends kmR7ah' man believes that taqwg is the "imer torch
whereby man can discern between right and ~ r o n g . "H~e ~co ncludes that while h a n
concems itself with the b e r life, and is&z concems itself with outward action, taqwii
concems itself equally with faith and surrender. h his words:
68~ahman"S, ome Key Ethical," 172-6. One of Rahman's weaknesses is that he does not
give a working definition of what he means by c'Islamic." This makes his view difficult to analyze.
6%ahman's emphasis on the importance of the term taqwg especially as the balance of
moral action, can be analyzed in many of his writings. To mention some of them: M;?or Z%emes,
9, 12, 25-3 1, 37, 45-6, 110; "Islam: Legacy and Contemporary Challenge," IsWc Studies 19, 4
(1980): 236-9; hIàm mdModem'ty: Trmsfomatioa of m htellectual Tradition (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1982), 155.
7%ahrnan, "Some Key Ethical," 176.
The most important function of taqw2 is to allow man to correctly examine
hunself and to see the right fiom the wrong ... It must be noted, however, that this
self-examination as it is irnplied in the notion of taqwâ cm never mean selfrighteousness
... If this self-examination had a built-in success, humanism would
work perfectly well and therefore would be no need for transcendence, But we
kaow how subjective the consciences of people can be. TaqwZ implies this very
transcendence since it implies that while the choice is ours and the effect is ours,
the final and truly objective judgment upon our performance is not ours but "Lies
with GO^."^^
One cm now discem how these three religio-ethical terms compose the essential
character of Fazlur Rahman's Islamic phüosophy. The term iman demonstrates that Islamic
philosophy c m o t be merely intellectual, as it implicitly condemns over-reliance on
rationally-denved doctrines. The second tem, islam, demonstrates that Islamic philosophy
cannot conceive of a doctrine without its being tied to a real act, because as the Qur'Zn
stipulates, "personal inner faith is by no means sufficient for God's p~rposes."'~In this
approach Lies the key to Rahman's critique of Muslim philosophers, whom he accuses of
being far too removed Eom the actual Lives of their CO-religionists, and too "enamoured of
their metaphysical heights to condescend to climb dom to ethics."" This view is echoed .
by Alparslan, his student, who regards Rahman not merely as a "theoretician" but as an
activist thinker as well." The third term, taqw& also h d s a place within Rahman's
73~ahman",S ome Key Ethical," 178-9.
ahma man, "Some Key Ethical," 175.
76~lparslaAnç ikgenç, "The Thinker of Islamic Revival and Reform," 237. Being his student,
Aiparslm shares the opinion of Rahman on the importance of ethics in philosophical discourse: "The
philosophical issues incIuded in the metaphysical realm are not only the problem of God,
immortality and revelation, but also such abstract problems as what is knowledge, being, fieedom,
and tnith. Ethicd problems are also a part of the metaphysical realm ("A Concept of Philosophy
in the Qur'anic Context ," Tbe Amen'cau /ornai of IsIarmc Social Scieoces 1 1,2 [1994]: 1 65). S ee
cnticism of M u s h philosophers. According to him, the only way in which one may attain
taqwZ "is to recognize both his powers and the limits God has put upon him as his natural
~ondition."'~T his is to Say that Muslim philosophers, being too heavily steeped in rationai
concepts, are liable to forget the limitations of their intellectual capacities.
Rahman's contention that Muslim philosophers neglected the field of ethics is,
however, open to debate. There were in fact a number of Muslim philosophers, such as al-
Kin6 (d. 866)," al-GhazaIi (d. 111 l)," Ibn Miskawayh (d. 1030),80 Nasr al-Din TÜsi (d.
1274);' and al-DawwG (d. 1501)w~h~o wrote comprehensive treatises on Islarnic ethics.
Moreover, as Nasr maintains, many of these philosophers did develop an ethical system
also his other work, 'Toward an Islamic Concept of Philosophy: A Response to the Modernists," in
Islam a d the Challenge of Modemity: Histoncal and Contemporay Cmtexts, ed. S hari fah Shi fa
Al-Attas (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1996), 535-89.
77~ahman"S, ome Key Ethical," 18 1. See also his M e r T hemes, 29-30, and "Islam: Legacy
and Contemporary," 236-7.
7 8 ~YÜbsU~fY acqÜb b. Ishaq &Kin& wrote a work on ethics entitled Risalah fi al-AkbIiq.
It is reported that this treatise exists together with other works of al-Kin& in a private library at
Aleppo. See Richard Walzer, "Some Aspects of Miskawaih's Tahdhib al-Akbiiq,," in Greek hto
Arabic (Oxford: Brno Cassirer, l962), 22 1.
7 9 ~ HbZm~id M&ammad al-Ghazali, @yZ CUÜm ai-Din (Cairo: Al-MatbaFat al-
Maymaniyah, 1894). The "Ethics" part has been translated by Nabih Amin Faris as The Book of
fia wiedge (Lahore: S h. Muhammad Ashraf, 1966).
''-ad Ibn Mdpmmmad Ibn Miskawayh, Tabdoib al-AkhiZq, ed. C. K. Zurayk (Beirut:
American University of BeUut, 1966). This work has been translated into English as TheRefinement
of Character, by C. K. Zurayk (Beimt: The American University of Beirut, 1968).
' ' ~ a $ r al-Din M&ammad ibn Mulpxnad WÜsi, AkhiZq-i Nagis (Lahor: Panjab
Yunivarsiti, 1952); English translation: Tbe Nairean Ethics, by G. M. Wickens (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1 964).
82~alâall -Din Maammad ibn Ascad ai-DawwiÜi?, Akb/Fq-i JdZG (Lakhnaw: Matbaci
Munshi Naval Kishor, 19 16); Engiish translation: Practfcd PhiIosophy ofrbe Muhammad' People,
by W. F. Thomson (London: The Oriental Translation Fund., 1839).
28
based, not only on 'rational ethics,' but on the specific teachings of the Qur'iin. Nasr fuaher
asserts that metaphysical discourse in Islamic philosophy was never entirely divorced from
ethics or fkom the practical aspects of religion?
In analyzing Rahman's critique of Muslun philosophers one may, therefore, wonder
why he does insist that an Islamic moral philosophy was never worked out. Rahman has
established his own criteria of moral philosophy as "a rational system of 'right' and 'wrong'
or 'good' and 'bad'." On this point, Rahman argues that such a system cm be found neither
among the orthodox %ho declared 'good' and 'bad' to be shaTand not 'a&' nor among
the Muctazilah, nor even among "pure" philosopher^.^^ Taking al-Ghazâri's system for an
example, Rahman reasons that in bis scheme "both kalam and law are to be related to
spiritual Life and thus personalized ... This highly persona1 religion does not see the need for
a public reform of law through a public, Le., rational, system of moral principles denved
from the ora an."^' Thus, Rahman conjectures that it is "the absence of the ernergence of
a self-conscious and independent ethics" which is principally responsible for the problems
which have plagued Islamic civilization through time?
II is clear from the above explanation that Rahman's criticism is directed at
orthodox ka/&, the Mu'tazilah and the Muslim philosophers, who have not produced a
p4~ahman'T, unctional Interdependence," 94. It mut be noted, however, that Rahman does
not state that the shan'ah is not important. His criticism is aimed at the heavy emphasis on the
shafiCah and the neglect of "the nature of man and his function." See p. 97 of the same article.
SS~ahrnan"F, unctional Interdependence," 93-4.
86~ahrnan"F, unctional Interdependence," 93-4.
29
ccQur'-~c-derivedra tional system of moral principles." He reproves them for their failure
to develop "a theory of howledge that would do justice to religious facts and moral
cogniti~n."~T' his might be true for the oahodox kal* since some of its supporters hold
the opinion that revelation and traditions are the onlv sources of howledge about right and
wrong. The case of the Mu'tazilah, however, is different. They initiated a type of discourse
which had certain philosophical overtones. Ln their view, "the justice of hurnan and of
divine acts is a real characteristic of the acts; and it is knowable in principle and often
h own in fact by natural human reason, without the aid of re~elation."'A~b~d al-JabbGr (d.
1025)' for example, argues that rïght and wrong can be understood by reason, "although not
on the whole by inflexible r -~les . ' 'I~n ~o ther words, his rationalism provides "a place for
revelation as a .in dispensable supplement to rea~on."~T"h us, it is very clear that although
this group gives a large space to reason, the Qur'iin is basic to its ethical precepts.
It is true that the Muslim philosophers' works on ethics were based on Greek or
Persian sources, as Rahman argues. An indication of this may be found in the third and fifth
chapters of Ibn Miskawayh's Tabdhib al-Akuliq which Richard Walzer argues were t &en
h m A nstotle's Nicornachean Ethi~s.~Fu' rthemore, Ibn Miskawayh did not discuss the
87~ahman~,I méMeToodo/o,q,1 25. Indeed, Rahman believes that the Akbi'Zq-i-NgiZand
AkblZq-i-JdZfiare essentially secular works (Rahman, Islam md Modem* 52).
"G. F. Hourani, Islamic Rationalism: The Etbics of 'Abd al-Jabbg (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1971), 10.
%G. F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition in 15i'mc Efhics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), 18.
'kichard Walzer, "AkhlZk," EP, 1:327. See Walzer's specific comments on Miskawayh's
sources in "Some Aspects," 220-35. Hourani holds the similar opinion and states that Miskawayhys
concepts of right and wrong, or good and evil, which justifies the view that this is not "the
place to look for ethical philosophy?" Seen in this Light, Rahman's cnticai remarks on the
Muslim philosophers' failure to produce a Qur'anic-denved, rational system of moral
principles seems to gain legitimacy. It should be noted, however, that Muslim philosophers
did indeed try to integrate Greek ethical teachings into their oivn religious tradition. Some
authors, such as Ibn Miskawayh, emphasized the compatibility of Greek moral philosophy
with the basic principles of Islamic tradition.93 More importantly, the need to assunilate the
notions of Greek ethics to the Qur7-nic teachings may not have been felt at the time.
Another thinker, Fakhr al-Din al-Raii (d. 1209) goes even further in proposing an ethical
concept which tried to reconcile "lslamic phiiosophy, in its Avicennian form, with theology
and the religious tradition in g e~~e r a lI.t" s~h~o uld also be borne in mind that this type of
work, together with Na& al-Din Tisi's and Dawwani's, "foliow a settled tradition of Hellenic
philosophy in Arabic, dealing with the perfection and ends of the soul, virtues as means and vices
as extremes" (Rcason and Tradition, 21). See also, among others, Majid Fakhry, Ethicai T'eon'es
in Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 6, and Fakhry, "The Platonism of Miskawayh and Its
Implications for His Ethics," Studr'a IsIarm'ca42 (1975): 50-2; G. E. von Gmebaum, "Concept and
Function of Reason in Islamic Ethics," Orins 15 (1962): 6; Zurayk, "Preface," The Refinemeot, xi.
9 2 ~uroan i , Ream and Tradition, 2 1.
9 3 ~ilolu strate his views on "anger," Miskawayh discusses verses ftom the Qur'iin, "al-Kahf'
32, 42, 45 where, according to him, God gives the most correct and the truest parables of
boastfulness (Ta6&7b7 196). Another example of Miskawayh's reference to the Qur7Zn in discussing
his ethics is his insistence that a human being should not perform evil deeds to achieve his souI's
perfection, which in turn leads to the real pleasure described by God in 32:17 : 'Wo sou1 knoweth
what delight of the eyes is hidden in reserve for them" (TabdbI'by 13). See also Walzer, ccAkhlZky"
328.
94~akhryE, thicai neoRes, 8. RaP's attempt to harmonize philosophy and theology makes
him an original and controversial thinker. He was brave enough to contradict the doctrines of the
Ashcarites, to which school which he belonged. Unfortunately, little research has been done on his
thought. See among others: Paul Kraus, "The 'Controversies' of Fakhr al-D?n al-RZ," N m C
Culture 12 (1938): 131-53; Murtada A. Muhibbu-Din, "Lmim Fakhr al-Din al-RE Philosophical
Theology in al-Tafsrf aZ-Kabri;" Hamdardlsafxzf'cus1 7,3 (1994): 55-84; and Fathalla Kholeif, A
3 1
discussion, where the concept of the perfection of the soul, based on the Platonic duality
of soul and body, represented one of the core areas of interest to the intellectuals of R Z ' s
tirne. For these reasons, Rahman's critical remarks that "a moral philosophy was never
worked out in the religioüs history of Islam,''95 and that "certain treatises of certain minor
philosophers on morals do not add up to m~ch,"'m~ ay be an exaggeration