FAZLUR RAHMAN'S ISLAMlC PHILOSOPHY (6)

CHAPTER III
ON THE VALUE OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY
IN THE CONTEMPQRARY WORLD
The pressures exerted by modem ideas and forces of social change, together with
the colonial interregnu in Muslim lands, has brought about a situation in which
the adoption of certain key modern Western ideas and institutions is resolutely
defended by some Muslims and often justified through the Qur' Zn, the wholesale
rejection of modemity is vehemently advocated by others, and the production of
"apologetic" literature that substitutes self-glorification for reform is virtually
endless. Against this background the evolving of some adequate herrneneut ical
method seems imperat ive.'76
Chapter one has shown that Fazlur Rahman does not separate his religious belief
fiom his philosophical thought, and that ethics plays an important role within his
framework. Towards the end of that chapter, it was also pointed out that Rahman's
definition of Islamic philosophy is specificdly characterized by his methodological
approach, which is not merely rational or theoretical, but grounded in the practical realm.
In this sense, Rahman's method of interpreting the Qur'En plays a great role in his
understanding of the value of Islamic philosophy in the contemporary world, since he argues
that the needs of contemporary man can oniy be satisfied by grasping the true meaning of
the Qur'in.
The present chapter takes up, in three sections, Fazlur Rahman's interpretation of
the value of Islamic philosophy in the contemporary world. Section one examines how his
Qur'anic methodology is distinct fiom the theories of contemporary tafi2 scholars or
exegetes. This section in fact covers different temtory fiom that explored in chapter two,
where the focus was the Quf-ihïc basis for his philosophical thought. hstead, a comparison
between Rahman's methodology and that of other exegetes is offered here to help in our
analysis of Rahman's unique approach. Section two analyzes philosophical expressions
which Rahman uses in understanding some themes in the Qur'z. Finally, section three of
this chapter wilI focus on the application of his methodology - deriving fiom a study of the
Qur'Zn itself -- with a view to providing an answer, or answen, to social problems in the
contemporary world. Sections two and three will focus on Rahman's Major Themes of rhe
Qur7&, which contains his philosophical expressions and the specific applications of his
methodology. In that work, Rahman examines important topics affecting human worldly
existence and man's final destiny, such as God, man, nature, prophethood, and eschatology.
His other works will also be used so far as they relate to our main subject.
A. Fazlur Rahman's Qur'inic Methodology
A general survey of the discourse on t a a i s beyond the scope of this thesis. Our
aim, rather, is to analyze Rahman's distinctive method in interpreting the Qur'in and to
compare it to that of other contemporary exegetes. For the purpose of comparison, the
exegetical views of two MusIim scholars, Bint al-Shiiti' (~Xisha Abd al-Rahman, b.
1912)'77 and Mawlânâ AbÜ al-Al: Mawdüdi (d. 1979),'" will be examined. The reason for
177cA'isha'A bd al-Reman is bown by her pseudonym Bint al-ShZti'. She was Professor
of Arabic Langage and Literature at the University of 'Ayn Shams in Egypt, and was a visiting
Professor at Umm Durmân Islamic University in Sudan. She is currently a professor at Qarawiyyin
University in Morocco. She is also a prolific writer. Among her pubIications are: ,Nrsi" H a b F
(Cairo: D g a l-Hila, 1961 ); Sukayna bint Wusa~(~Coa iro: Dir al-HilZl, 1965); Ai-M&h al-IsIZkn7
li T ' 7 ai-Màr'ah (Cairo: Matbacat Mukhaymir, 1967); Bayn al-'Aq7dah wa al-&ûtiyâr(Beirut: DG
al-Najih, 1973), and other works on Qur'hic studies.
L 7 8 ~ a ~wda~s ad faim ous Pakistani thinker. His work of tafsri(Ta137m al-Qur'ik) was
originally published in Urdu and later translated into English as Towarak Lhdentmchng the Qur'c,
choosing these two scholars is the fact that they were relative contemporarïes of Rahman,
even though their respective methodologies differed in many respects.
Rahman is well aware of the abundance of works in the field of Qur'anic
interpretation, both those written by Muslirns and those of non-Muslims. In his discussion
of earlier, modern, Westem works on the Qur'k, Rahman divides these works into three
categories: "(1) works that seek to trace the influence of Jewish or Christian ideas on the
Qur'ik; (2) works t hat attempt to reconstnxt the chronological order of t he Qur'5n; and (3)
works that aim at describing the content of the Qur7&, either the whole or certain
aspects."179A rnong these three categories, the third is critical to a proper treatment of the
subject. In Rahman's view, however, this has drawn the l e s t attention fiom scholars, and
among those that deal with it, "none is rooted in the QurYZni t~el f . ' ' '~~
The number of studies on the Qur'Zn in the West has increased over the past decade.
This increase, in Rahman's view, is due to the greater perception of Westem scholars of the
importance of Islam as a world phenornenon. Rahman divides these studies into four
tram. Z. 1. Ansari (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1988). On his Iife and work see Charles J.
Adams, 'The ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi," in South Asim Poiitics and Relrgion, ed. Donald E.
Smith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 371-97); see also Kalim Bahadur, ï3eJamBat-i
f i l ~ o f P a k i ~(tNmew Delhi: The Chet ana Publications, 19 78), and Charles J. Adams, "Mawdudi
and the Islarnic State," in Voices ofResugent Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983), 99-133.
179~ahrnaM *n, Themes, xii. Rahman admires some early scholarly works done by
Westerners on the Qur'k, such as Abraham Geiger's Was bat Mohammed aus dem Judenthume
Au&enommeo (Bonn: F. Baaden, 1883), and Hartwig Hirschfeld's Judische Elernente h K m
(1 878). He also praises Richard Bell's The Ongin o fI slam ih its Chstiao En viro~mec(tL ondon:
Mcmillan, 1926), despite some questionable theses.
18(khnanM, @or Themes, xii-v. See also his article where he discusses the works on the
Qw'& in detail, "Some Recent Books on the Qur7& by Western Authors," The Jomd of Religion
64, 1, (1994): 73-95 (for his critique of Western scholars' lack of attention to the contents of the
Qur'Zn, see p. 74).
65
categones. Some of these studies have been written by Christian scholars, expressing for
the most part Christian views and aims.'" Other studies are concemed with the formation
and collection of the Qur'anic text. This includes the Literary and structural analysis of the
Q ~ r ' i n . 'T~h~e third consists of works which are devoted to the meaning of the Qur'Zn
itselfLgT3 he fourth and final category includes works which do not deal directly with the
18L~ahmgaivne s some examples of these types of works. He discusses the works by Johan
Bouman, Gott und Mensch im Koran (Darmstadt, 1977)- Jacques Jomier, Les Grma3 Themes du
Coran (Paris: Le Centmian, 1978), and Kenneth Cragg, Tae Event oftbe Qu-'% (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1971). Rahman argues that Cragg, unlike Jomier, does not necessarily write hrchristians.
Both of them, however, understand the Qur7& "through Jesus and Christian doctrine, rather than
on its own terms." Despite his critique of these scholars, Rahman praises their works, which "have
been not only sincere and sympathetic but, and largely because of this, insightfd and perceptive"
(Rahman, "Some Recent Books," 83,86).
L8'~nth is category, Rahman notes t hree examples, narnely: John Wansbro ugh's Qu'& ic
Stucües: Sowces a n d M o & of Scriptural htezprefations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, f 977),
J o b Burton's B e C ollections o f t he Q u r ' ~(C ambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), and
Angelika Neuwirth's Studiea zur Kompositiotl der Mekkanschen Suren (1981). As might be
expected, Rahman disagrees with Wansbrough's thesis that "the Qur'k's genesis lies in the Jewish
[and, to some extent, Christian] tradition, that the formation of the Qur'ihic text was not completed
until nearly the ninth century C. E... and that the text thus exists essentially ixrespective of whether
M@anunad ever existed or not" (Rahman, "Some Recent Books," 86). See also his Majr rnernes,
xiii. In regard to Burton's thesis that the Qur'Zn is the work of the Prophet himself, Rahman
maintains that it is too speculative, since Burton does not give positive evidence to support his
argument (Rahman, "Some Recent Books," 89). The case of Neuwirth, however, is different.
Contrary to Wansbrough and Burton, she holds that the "textus receptus" of the Qur'b was fked
under 'Uthman. Her main thesis is that "the literary composition of the Qur'Zn does not fit the
classifications Western scholars have put it in." It is material for recitation, and, for this reason, "its
formal features must be investigated to appreciate it as it deserves to be appreciated" (Rahman,
Tome Recent Bo0 ks," 9 1-2).
lS3~e rRea hman notes the works of Helmut Gatje, The QurY& audlts Exegesis, tram. A.
T. Welch (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), and Paul Nwiy a, Exegese coranique et
lagage mystique: Nouvel essai sur le Iexlque techoique des mystiques Musulmms (Beirut : Cat holic
Press, 1970). Rahman regards the first work as "a very helpfiil sarnple of representative Muslim
Qur'Zn cornmentaries" on a number of themes in the Qur75n, while the second work is cchighly
scholarly with careful analysis" (Rahman, "Some Recent Books," 92-3).
Qur'k, but contain some form of Qur'anic interpretati~n."~
Rahman maintains t hat early twentiet h-century schoIarship suffered fiom cultural
and intellectual prejudices. In fact, he feels that it failed to distinguish between "the
religious commuities as the bearers of religious cultures and the nonnative truths or
transcendent aspects of religions."185 Because of this neglect, Rahman argues, Muslims are
"often invitcd to accept scholarship which is very t ight and neat [even dogmatic] so f a as
its methods and categories go, but which indulge in a fkee-for-all Islam at the same time."lS6
Rahman criticizes the strategy adopted by those who support Wansbrough's
methods, which negates historical veracity and applies the "literary method." He further
objects to Rippin's quotation of the accepted notion that Judaism and Islam are religions
"in history." He considers rnisleading the thesis of Rippin, who argues for "the non-
L84~ahrnapnoi nts to two examples in this category, namely, John Wansbrough's The
Sectariau Milieu: Content and Composition of Islamic Salvatioa Histoiy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979), and Patricia Crone's and Michael Cook's Hagan'sm: The Making of the
~ Z ~ Z Z Z IWC urkf(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). These two works are similar, in the
sense that both apply literary analysis in their research. Rahman criticizes these atternpts as
cbuncontrolled desires and wishful thinking with a singular indifference to canons of sound
scholarship and objectivity" (Rahman, "Some Recent Books," 74).
L 8 S ~ Ra a~hml a~n, "Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies: Review Essay," in
A p a c h e s to Islam in ReIigrous Studi'es7 ed. Richard C. Martin (Arizona: The University of
Arizona Press, 1985), 194. Charles Adams shares the opinion of Rahman that it is a matter of fact
that the Qur'inic scholarship in the West pays more attention to critical approach, in spite of an
attempt at discovering, explaining, and expounding its content. Adams, however, mentions some
works on the field, such asDaud Rahbar's GodofJusfice(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960), whicti supports
the idea "that the Qur'an possesses a distinctive world view of its own that should be appreciated
for its own sake," and Fiegenbaum's "Prophethood from the Perspective of the Qur'an" (Ph.D.
dissertation, McGill University, 1973), which shows that the Qur7Znic ideas have been
rnisunderstood by many sciiolars (Charles J. Adams, "Islamic Religious Tradition," in Tbe Study of
the Md d e Est: Research and Scbokus-b~pin the Nummities and the Socid Sciences, ed. L. B inder mw York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976],62-3).
186~ahma"nA7p proaches to Islam," 197.
historicity of Islam by assert ing t hat no extra-literary corroboration in terms of
archaeological data are available for Rahman also rejects the claim that
Wansbrough offered a new histoncal method to deal with the theological problem of the
origin of Islam. In his view, a historical approach "cannot get rid of the theological
pr~blern."'~~
Rahman agrees with Jacques Waardenburg's argument that an outsider cannot
adequately, let alone fully, understand the meaning of other religions. Rahman also quotes
W. C. Smith to the effect that "a statement about a religion by an outsider would be correct
[or adequate?] if the followers of that religion Say 'yes' to it.7'189R ahman proposes a method
of studying Islam which aspires to intellectual understanding or appreciation. The first
requirement of such a method is that the investigating subject should be open-minded and
unprejudiced. lg0 This leads to the second requirement that the researcher should be honest
in constructing the reality and to avoid historical reductioni~rn.'~R' ahman proposes a
ahman man, "Approaches to Islam," 198-9.
1s8~ahman"A, pproaches to Islam," 199. Rahman does not agree with Rippin's daim that
the literary method had been applied by Goldziher and Schacht in their critiques of h a m . In
Rahman's understanding, both Goldziher and Schacht relied instead on a historical method in
showing that "certain Hadiths had, in fact, onginated after certain other Hadiths." Rahman claims
that he himseif act ually has applied historicd criticisrn in his ~ a mMcet hodology o fH istory
(Rahman, "Approaches to Islam," 199).
189~ahma"nA, pproaches to Islam," 190. See also p. 197.
'?Ey the terni "prejudiced" he means a situation which is preconditioned in a manner that
is not conducive to the study of the object as it is. He argues that "prejudice" does not necessasdy
relate to religion or other emotional conditions: "Intellectual prejudice may corne in the form of
preconceived notions or categories" (Rahman, "Approaches to Islam," 192).
19L~ahmeaxnp lains that "historical reductionism~i' s a method which tries to reconstruct
history based on inadequate data while at the same time failing to recognize those inadequacies. An
example of the application of this method cari be found within the "attempt to 'explain' Islam's
68
phenomenological approach to the study of Islam, since with this approach the investigator
is expected to "recognize the Quya%nd t he Sunna as normative criterion-referents for dl
expressions and understanding of Islam."'g2
At the same time, Rahman cl- that Muslims themsetves are afiaid to offer views
which differ fiom received opinions. He fûrther criticizes their study of the subject for its
lack of "a genuine feel for the relevance of the Qur'ih today, which prevents presentation
in tems adequate to the needs of contemporary man."'93 The problem with most Muslim
works on the subject, according to Rahman, is that they take the Qur'Zn verse by verse and
explain it accorduigly. This procedure c m o t produce a cohesive outlook on life or the
universe. Meanwhile, the topical arrangements of the HO^^ Book that have been produced
by both Muslims and non-MusIims cannot give a comprehensive answer to questions on the
genesis and even its nature with reference to Jewish, Christian, or other 'influences'" (Rahman,
"Approaches to Islam," 193).
Lgt~ahma"nA, pproaches to Islam," 198. Another scholar, James Royst er - in his study of
Maarnmad - also discusses the phenomenological approach. He defines this approach as, "to accept
that which appears, that which the religious tradition presents, on its own tems." He realizes that
some weahesses exist in this approach, since someone may base his research on inadequate sources,
or unconsciously influenced by their personai bias. He, however, argues that the phenomenological
approach is "the sine qua non for understanding the cornmitment and convictions of beiievers in
another tradition," and "enables one to attribute ultimacy to the religious dimensions of Islam, and
consequently, corne to an understanding of the tradition fiom the perspective of Muslims
themselves" (James E. Royster, "The Study of Mu&mmad: A Survey of Approaches from the
Perspective of the History and Phenomenology of Religion," The Mu(ilm Wor-62 [1972]: 62,64,
70). For a detailed study of this approach see also Royster, "The Meaning of Muhammad for
Muslirns: A Phenomenological Study of Recurrent Images of the Prophet" (Ph.D. dissertation,
Hartford Serninary, 1970). Charles Adams, having defined the phenomenological approach in a
similar way with that of Rahman and Royster, argues that "the stimulus they [the
phenomenologists] oEer is perhaps the brightest hope for the advance in our understanding of Islam
as a religion" (Adams, "Islamic Religious Tradition," 51).
L93~ahmaMn,e or Themes, xii.
Qur'anic concept of God, man, or society.'"
Rahman's criticism of the exegetical works of non-Muslim scholars, especially that
of Wansbrough, is nevertheless open to debate. Before analyzing his critique, it is important
to note that the methodologies which Western scholars apply in their study of Islam rnay
be divided into two categones: source-critical methods or the "revisionist" approach, and
the "traditional" approach.Ig5 Both of these methods have their own characteristics. The
source-critical approach is characterized by the denial of historical validity for those
accounts which are based purely on "facts" derived fiom Muslim literary sources. This
approach also includes relevant contemporary, non-Arabic literature and the findings of
archeology, epigraphy, and n~mi s r n a t i c sT.~he~ "~tr aditional" method, on the other hand,
is characterized by the use of Muslim literary sources.197
194~ahmaMn,a jor memes, xi. Rahman is very much convinced Chat this method will fail
to grasp the generai meaning of the Qur'Zn behind the literal text itself, since its treatment of the
subject cannot yield "an effective 'weltanschauung' that is cohesive and meaninml for life as a
whole" (Rahman, ''hterpreting," 45). See also Rahman, Islam, 38-9, and Rahman, Islam aad
Modemity, 2-3.
19'J. Koren and Y. D. Nevo, "Methodological Approaches to Islamic Studies," DerISIam 68
(1 99 1): 87. Royster gives similar categories in discussing the methodologies used by Western
scholars in their studies on ML@ammad. The first category is a non-empirical (normative) approach
in which the aims of the studies "are attained with only limited recourse to the observable or
demonstrable," and tend to be critical to the study of Maarnmad. The second is an empirical
(descriptive) approach since the purposes "are manifestly sought within the realm of the observable
or demonstrable" (Royster, "The Study of M~ammad, "4 9).
19%oren and Nevo argue that the development of c~revisionism"f aces much opposition,
especialiy nom those who apply the "traditional approach" to Islamic studies. The general neglect,
however, is not based on its methods or its evidence, but on its conclusion. Citing the example of
R. B. Serjeant 's review of Wansbrough's Qm'anic Studies (Jouroal of the Royal Asiatic Society
[1978]: 76-8), Koren and Nevo argue that the "traditionalists" tend to ignore or even to reject the
validity of a source-aitical method (Koren and New, ''Methodological Approaches," 88-9).
197~oreannd Nevo argue that these two approaches never touch each ot her since the sourcecritical
method "typically discounts the former's vdidity as historical enquiry," while the
''traditional" method ignores the former dtogether (Koren and Nevo, cMethodological Approaches,"
70
Wansbrough fds into the former category -- that of the source-critical method --
while Rahman employs the c'theologico-historical" rneth~d.'~S' een in this light, Rahman's
critique of Wansbrough's thesis seems somewhat apologetic. Taking, for example,
Wansbrough's second thesis that "the Qur'b is a composite of several traditions and hence
post-Prophetic," Rahman argues that "there is a distinct lack of historical data on the
origin, character, evaluation, and personalities involved in these ' tradit ions.'"199 When one
examines Wansbrough's thesis critically and places his argument within its appropriate
approach, one h d s that Wansbrough's thesis is a logical consequence of the approach he
applies. Rippin, who has severely criticized Rahman's critique of Wansbrough, argues that
Rahman fails to consider the possible validity of other methods. His view is that Rahman
has to distinguish between "the truth c1ai.m~o f the religion itself and the intellectual claims
of various methods, for uitimate 'tmth' is not susceptible to methodological proced~res."~~
Upon closer examination, however, one fin& that Rahman does in fact realize that
different approaches to a single object will yield different results. Nevertheless, the most
important thing, in Rahman's understanding, is that some approaches -- such as literary
criticism and historical reductionism -- cannot be applied to the study of Islam because if
these wrong approaches were applied to Islam, they would give the wrong impression on
L9 8 ~ d r eRwipp in, 'Xiterary Analysis of Quryàn,T afsir, and Sra: The Methodologies of
John Wansbrough," in Approaches to Mm, 163.
'?Rippin, "Literary Analysis," 163. However, while criticising Rahman's work for not
considering the vaiidity of other methods of approach to the subject, Rippin judges Rahman's work
as not behg a scholarly endeavour for its lack of methodological awareness.
71
Islam itself. Therefore, he sought the approach that wodd best dow outsiders to
underst and Islam.201
Rahman's criticism of the inadequacy of Muslim works in the field of tafsii in
responding to the needs of contemporary people, on the one hand, and of the topical
arrangements of the Qur'b, which cannot give a comprehensive account of the Qur'anic
concept of God, man, or society, on the other, is justifiable. It is true that many t&.works
analyze Quf-&ic teachings thernatically; these works, however, do not respond to the needs
of contemporary people. Instead, most of them try to translate the Qur'iin literally, and to
escape fiom the real proboblems that need to be faced. Some works that translate the Qur'ih
verse by verse face the same fate, in his view. This method cannot yieid any insight, since
the Qur'k needs to be understood as a ~ h o l e . ~ ' ~
Rahman reaüzes that the need to understand the Qur'in as a unity requires a study
of the views of the earliest Muslim generations, as well as of language, gramma., and style.
However, he considers this need to be of secondary importance since never in Islamic
intellectual history has the effort to understand the Qur'iin as a unity been seriously
undertaken. Rahman argues that "the historical tradition will therefore be more an object
of judgment for the new understanding than an aid to it, although this histoncai traditional
201~tnhi s respect, Rahman argues that religious expaiences are aüve and constitute an
integrai unity, which cannot be conveyed by a historian or social scientist (Rahman, "Approaches
to Islam," 19 1-8, see especiaify p. 193, and 197-8).
'%s an example of Rahman's response to the needs of contemporary man, he states that
family serves as a basis of society and takes pains to explain the role of society, the role of women,
and how to face the changes of these roles. The discussion of these aspects wiIl be treated in section
three of this chapter, in discussing the application of Rahman's methodology of interpreting the
Qur'an.
product can undoubtedly yield ins ight~. "T~h~e~ fu aher effort that one has to make is the
"intellectual endeavou. or jihiid," technically cded @ibi(i, i.e. "the effort to understand the
rneaning of a relevant text or precedent in the past, containing a rule, and to alter that rule
by extending or restricthg or otherwise modimg it in such a manner that a new situation
can be subsurned under it by a new solution."2M
With respect to this method, Rahman in his earlier works insists on the importance
of studying the Qur7Zn in the order of its revelation. The reason for this is that one can get
"an accurate enough perception of the basic impulse of the Islamic movernent as
disthguished fiom measures and institutions established later." Rahman further argues that
this method will "save us much of the extravagance and artificiality of rnodemist
interpretations of the Qur'Zn," and will "bring out the overall import of the Qur'anic
message in a systematic and coherent rna~mer."~A~l*th ough Rahman achowledges that a
study of this nature could help to reconstruct the Qur7%pna ssage by passage and provide
detailed references to the verses, in his Later writings he cnticizes this method as being
2w~ahmanIs,/ am andModemitrv,7 -8. T h e notion of iJtihZa
view. He openly rejects the opinion that the gate of Qtiha(iin Islam was closed. He, however, admits
that 'khereas the gate of Ij.tibZdwas never forrnally closed by anyone --that is to say, by any great
authority in Islam-- nevertheless a state of afEtirs had gradually but surely corne to prevail in the
Muslim World where thinking on the whole, and as a general rule, ceasedy' (Rahman, IsIamr'c
Methodology, 149-50, see also, pp. 170-2). Rahman emphasizes the importance of the originality
of thought to reconstmct Islamic intellectualisrn: 'Tt is the growth of a genuine, original and
adequate IslaWc thought that must provide the real criterion for judging the success or faiIure of
an IsIamic educational system" (Rahman, film mdModemity, 1). See dso Rahman's discussion
of the concept of Ijtiha(Iin kIm, 77-80, 115, 198-9, in his "The Impact of Modernity in Islam,"
Isarm'c Studies, 5,2 (1966): 121-2, and in his Legacy and Contemporary," 240-2.
2M~azluRra hman, "Islamic Modemism: Its Scope, Method and Alternatives," iutematiooal
JournalofMddlle East Stucües 1 (1970): 329.
73
merely an explanation of "what is germinal in the original, master idea." He therefore came
to offer a logical approach, as opposed to a chronoiogical one, for synthesizhg Qur'anic
themesFM 06s method, as we will see in the foUowing section, has the potential to make
a large contribution to tafsU.discourse, since Rahman uses it to understand certain Qur'anic
themes and to analyze them through a philosophical approach.
At fkst glance, Rahman's cnticism of the chronological approach to the Qur'Zn
seems to contradict his emphasis on the importance of the historical background for
undastanding the Holy Book itself. Upon closer scrutiny, however, one finds that Rahman
does not reject the study of the historical background of the Qur'&; rather, he criticizes the
chronological approach to understanding the whole picture of the Qur'Zn, which leads us
to understand the verses in an "atomistic" way.'"
Rahman reasons that the application of an appropriate method of interpreting the
Qur'Zn depends on d i f f i t i a t u i g the goal or "moral ideal" which is ment by the Qur'iin
fiom the legal specifics of the verse. It is this moral ideal which is universal and a guidance
to Muslims for dl time. While its specific legd provisions must be adaptable, given that
the conditions of seventh-century Arabian society cannot apply everywhere and for all time,
the moral principles behind them have to remain constant.208R ahman believes that 'the
basic elan of the Qur7Eni s moral" and that "moral law is imm~table."T~h~us , for Rahman,
206Rahrnan, Alajor Themes, xi-ii.
207 Rahman, Islam and Modemitx 2-3, 14 1-5.
208~ahma'nT,h e Impact of Modernity," 12 1-2.
'%ahman, Islam, 32-3.
the eternity of legal specific of the Qur'ik is in its moral principles or in the values which
underlie them, not in the text itself.2" Rahman believes that this approach is the only
acceptable interpretive method that cm do justice to "the demands of intellectud and moral
integrity;" only in this way can "the message of the Qur'Zn becorne relevant to the
conternporary sit~ation.'~"
At h t glance, this method bears a certain similanty to the approach elaborated by
Bint al-Shiifi'.212T he latter consists of four steps. The &st involves the collection of ail
suras and verses on the topic to be studied? The second method consists in classimg
these verses in chronoIogicd order in order to study the time and place of their revelation.
The occasions of revelation, however, can only be considered insofar as they are the
contextual conditions of the revelation. In her view, the meaning of these verses must be
denved fiom the general meaning of the words, not fkom their specific rea~ons .h~' ~th e
next step Bint al-ShZti' analyzes the original Linguistic meaning of those words according
to t heir various material and figurative (aJ-&ks.d wa a(-mq&~ab) applications. Their
meanings cm best be understood by collecting all f o m of the word in the Qur'iin and by
studying them both in the context of the verses and suras and, more generdy, in that of the
21 1 Rahman, "The Impact of Modernity," 121. See aiso his Islam md Modemity, 154.
212~haecq uired her method nom her professor, AnZn al-KhGE (d. 1966) - who later became
her husband -- while studying at Fu'ad 1 University in Cairo. She elaborated her method based on
al-KtiiiIi's book Mm&J T~di(dC airo: DZr ai-Ma%fah, 1961 ). So far, she has interpreted 14 short
suras of the Qur'k.
ishah 'Abd al-R&m& Bint ai-S h&i ' , al-Td7r a(-BayZZIi a(-QurY& a i - K a vol.
1 (Egypt: DZr al-Macirif, 1990), 10.
Q~r ' i i n .~T'h~e Iast step that she proposes is based on the idea that to understand the
"secret" (sinj of QurY-Mc words, one should consider both the letter (the explicit rneaning)
and the spirit (the implicit meaning) of the Qm'-Euic text. Beyond this, she rejects any
interpretation of the Qur'5.n which included stones descnbed as IsrZYIiwât (Jewish-
Christian materials), as well as sect &an interpret a t i ~ n s . ~ ' ~
The first and second steps, in particular, in which Bint al-ShSti7 collects alI suras
and verses on the topic to be studied, and argues that the meaning of these verses are to be
derived fiom the generality of the words, rather than fiom their specific reasons, resemble
Rahman's method. Moreover, both authors believe that their methods can be used to
understand the moral ideal b e h d the written text. Upon closer examination, however, one
h d s that Rahman's method differs fkom that of Bint al-Sh$i7. Rahman does not simply
group verses with common themes; rather, he employs a logical approach in order to
identie the basic concept of each theme discussed: "in discussing God, for example, the
idea of monotheism --which is logicdly imperative- is made the foundat ion-stone of the
entire treatment, and all other Qur7Znic ideas on God are either derived fkom it or subsurned
under it, as seemed best to establish the synthetic concept of GO^."^" Bint Sh@i7, on the
other hand, applies a philological approach in her search for the onginal meaning of a key
'l6~int al-Sh-i ', al-Tafk L 1. For discussion of her taGr see Issa J. Boullat a, Wedern
Qur'Zn Exegesis: A Study of Bint al-ShâtiMsM ethod," The MmIim World64 (1974): 103-13. See
aiso J. J. G. Jansen, me hterprtation of the Korm 19 Modem Emt (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 8-9,
58-9,68-76; C. Khooij, Vint al-Shif i' : A Suit able Case for Biography?" in Tbe Chdenge of the
Mdde East, ed. A-El-Shaikh, et al. (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1982), 67-72.
217~ahmmM,a jor Themes, xi.
word in a verse by examining its various applications.
One rnay also profitably compare Rahman's methodology of interpreting the QurY%
with that of Mawdüsi. Mawdüdi states clearly that his taZiis not aimed at scholars and
researchers. Rather, it is intended for "the lay reader, the average educated person, who is
not well-versed in Arabic and so is unable to make fuli use of the vast treasures to be f o n d
in classical works on the Q ~ r ' b . " ~H~is* t afir'r, therefore, seeks to clarify the ambiguities
one may encounter in reading the scrïpture. Mawdüdi applies a fiee form of interpretation
of the Qur'in as opposed to literal translation, which he believes cannot fi11 certain needs.
He calls his work an "explanatory or interpretative exposition."219 He begins his
comrnentary on each s&ab with preface explaining the meaning of each title. This is
followed by notes on the penod of a particular revelation, the circumstances obtaining at
the time, and its needs and pr~blems.*~
Mawdüdi's method is clearly different f?om that of Rahman. MawdGdi interprets
the Qur'iin verse by verse and, accepting the opinions of classical Muslim wr i t e r~,a~p'p lies
the traditional approach. Rahman, on the other hand, adopts the thematic approach and
2 1 8 ~ a w d T~o6w ,a rds Undef~tandt'ng1.~
2L9 ~ awd ~Tdo wi ,a rds Uodexstaudiog,4 .
Z2%urther discussion on his method of interpreting the Qur'Fm, see Charles 3. Adams,
"AbÜy l-A% Mawdüdi 's T ' i r a al-QurJâ3," in Approaches to the &tory of the Lnfeqretatiao of
rbe Qw'ai7, ed. A. Rippin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 307-23. For information conceming his
works and other works written on him, see Q. Z. Siddiqi, S. M. Aslam, and M. M. Ahsan, "A
Bibliography of Writings by and about MawlkZ Sayyid Abu1 AlZ Mawdüdi," in I s I ~ I c
Perspectives: Studies a Honour ofM à wi'aSayyid Abu1 Ac.; Ma W~Ge"ds~. K hursid Ahmad and
Z.I. Ansari (Leicester: The fslamic Foundation, 1979), 3-14.
22L~ayyAidbù al-Ali Mawdüiai, A Shed Xisory of the Revivalst Muvernent in Islam ,
tram. AI-Ashcari (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1 W2), 30-3.
77
employs YfihZd to derive Qur'anic principles. It is tme that both authors emphasize the
importance of the background of revelation, or the asbab a l - n d . Rahman's disagreement
with Mawdüdi, however, Lies in his conviction that the Qur'5.11 should be understood "in its
total and specific background [and doing this study systematically in a historical order], not
just studying it verse by verse or passage by passage with an isolated 'occasion of
revelat ion' (sha 'h al-n mi.""
B. Some Philosophical Expressions
An examination of Rahman's philosophical expressions, most of which are to be
found in his Major Themes of the Qm'&, is important if we are to see how far he applied
222~ahmaIns,l am aod Modemit- 145. Rahman's disagreement with MawdÜdiYsv iew of
Islam is apparent. He claims Mawdüdi was more a journalist than a serious scholar. Rahman further
argues that MawdÜdi7s attitude, as well as that of the rest of the Jama'at-i Islarni and Muslim
Brotherhood members, are anti-intellectual, ''their reasoning being that Islam is really a 'simple' and
'clear cut' affair, that the Prophet was never the centre of an intellectual movement but rather
headed a moral-practical movement ..." (Rahman, Islam and Modemity, 1 16-7). He recalls a
conversation with Mawdüdi: "1 myselfremember well that after 1 had passed my M.A. examination
and was studying for my Ph.D. at Lahore, Mawdudi remarked, after inquiring what 1 was studying,
'The more you study, the more your practical faculties will be numbed. Why don't you corne and
join the Jama'at? The field is wide open.' At that time my reply was, 'Somehow I love studying'"
(Rahman, Islam mdModemity, 117). See also Rahman's other articles dealing with Mawdüdi,
"Intemal Religious Developments," 878-9; cbMuslim Modemism in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-
Continent," Bulletin of the Scbool of Onkntd and Alfici117 StucGes 21, 1 (1958): 96-7;
c'Implementation of the Islamic Concept of State in the Pakistani Milieu," Irslmc Stua7e.s 6, 3
(1967): 208, 212; "Currents of Religious Thought in Pakistan," IslamC Studies 7, 1 (1968): 2-6;
"Islam and the Constitutional Probkm of Pakistan," Studia hlmca 32 (1970): 277; "The
Ideological Experience of Pakistan," Islam and the Modem Age 2, 4 (1971): 3-6; and "islam in
Pakistan," JomalofSoulh Asian aodMdde Easrem Studies8,4 (1985): 36-7. Despite his severe
criticism of Mawdüdi, Rahman expresses his appreciation for the latter in one of his books: "Here
1 want to record that two Pakistani intellectuds, AbÜ'I-A% Mawdüdi and Ishtiâq Husain Quresh?,
passed away in September 1979 and in January 1981. Their departure is a loss to Islam, despite my
severe, and 1 believe perfectly justified, criticisrn of themy' (Rahman, mdModemity, ix). For
a cornparison between Rahman's and Mawdiidi's approaches to methodological, theological, social,
political and economic issues, see D. L. Berry "The Thought of Fazlur Rahman," 130-60.
78
these "philosophical" concepts in order to express his understanding of the concept of Go4
man, nature, prophecy and eschatology in the Qur'b, and if we are to investigate his
agreement or disagreement with these concepts. The term LLphilosophicalr'e' fers in this case
to concepts that have been discussed by Muslun and non-Muslim philosophers of the
medieval penod and antiquity - God, man, nature, prophecy and eschatology. The airn here
solely is to identiQ Rahman's "philosophical" enunciation of these themes, and not to
attempt a description of the content of the concepts themselves.
In his treatment of the concept of God in the Qur'ih, Rahman discusses the notion
of the contingency of everythuig in the Eyes of God- He explains that "the whole of nature
is one firm, well-knit structure with no gaps, no ruptures, and no dislocations." It is,
however, autonomous, but not autocratic, since "it has no warrant for its own existence and
it cannot explain itself? Rahman criticizes the est ablished thinking on this issue, ranging
fiom the Greeks to Hegel, to the eEect that "nothing" is an empty word since 'Yhere cm
be no nothing and we cannot imagine it ." In Rahman's view, it is theoretically possible that
there should be no nature at all, and this is exactly what contingency means. He fùrther
argues that "a contingent cannot be thought of without that upon which it is onti in gent.''^^
The Qur'in (16:9) teaches that when one thinks about nature, one must "find God."
Rahman maintains that this is not a "proof' of God's existence, since "in the thought of the
224~ahmanfu rther argues that "Those who think that nature is 'given' and therefore
somehow 'necessary' are iike a child for whom toys are 'given' and therefore somehow 'necessary"'
(Rahman, M@r Themes, 3).
Qur'b, if you cannot '£ïndy God, you will never 'prove' Hirn."' As a consequence of this
discovery, he beüeves that "Gad cannot be regarded as an existent among other existents.
In the metaphysical realm, there c m be no democratic and equal sharing between the
Original, the Creator, the Self-Necessary, and the borrowed, the created, the c ~ n t i n g e n t . " ~ ~
hstead, Rahman regards God as the "dimension which makes other dimensions possible ...
He is 'with' everything; He constitutes the integrity of everything ... God, then, is the very
meaaing of reality, a meaning rnanifested, clarified, and brought home by the universe,
helped even further by man.7m7 It is interesting to note that in discussing God's mercy and
power, Rahman descnbes Him as the "Light, whereby everything h d s its proper being and
its conduct," referring to the Qur'inic verse (24:35):
God is the light of the heavens and the earth: the ükeness of His Light is that of
a niche wherein is set a lamp; the lamp is [encased] in a glass; this glass is [so
brilliant] as though it were a pearly star. [The lamp] is lit by [the oil of] a blessed
tree which is neither Eastern nor Western, and whose oil is apt to catch light even
though fire hardly touches it. [God is] Light upon Light and He guides to His
m~ahman, Major nemes, 3. Rahman further argues that "the Qur'in does not 'prove' God
but 'points to' Him fiom the existing universe. Even if there were no ordered universe, but only a
single being, it would still point beyond itself because it is a mere contingent; but there is not a mere
single contingent, t here is a whole ordered and perfect ly working universe" (Rahman, M W Iaemes,
10). Accordingly, in his view, "the recurring Qur'bic invitations and exhortations, 'Do you not
think?' 'Do you not take heed?"' does not relate with "devising formal proofs for God's existence
or 'infen-ing' God's existence, but with 'discovenng' God and developing a certain perception by
'lifting the veil' from the mind" (Rahman, M@r Themes, 1 1).
2?7~ahmanM, ajr Themes, 4-5. By stating that God is 'Wth" everything, or that "God is
not an item among items," or that Wis very infinitude implies not a one-sided transcendence but
equally His being 'with' His creation," Rahman realizes the danger of "pantheism." That is why he
explains that "we certainly do not mean to suggest that God IS everything or is in everything, even
though Bis presence is all-pervasive, When we say that God is concrete and that He cannot be
narrowed by interpret ations or approaches t hat are intellect ual and cult mal abstractions, we cert aidy
do not imply that if all these approaches are mechanically combined, the aggregate could represent
the truth" (Rahman, Mqbr TThmes, 16).
Light whom He ~ i l l s . . . ~ ~
The Qur'Zn further maintains that God did not create the miverse in sport. The
universe points to a purposefd creator. Acceptance of this proposition, however, does not
hply a bliud faith, since it is based on a consideration of pure chance as well as a supreme
creator. He criticizes the Greek thinkers who argued that the universe is solely a product
of pure chance and their idea -- to which some modem astronomers also adhere -- of a
cyclical universe. Ln his view, these notions contradict any purposefulness in creatiodzg
Since the concept of nature in the Qurk is closely linked to that of God, Rahman's
philosophical attitude towards nature will be examined in this part. Rahman proposes the
question: '7s it more rational to believe that this natural order, so vast and so complex, is
also a purposive order, or is it more rational to believe that it is pure chance?" He
rhetorically asks: "Cari chance order be cohesive and lasting order? Does not chance itself:
in fact, presuppose a fiamework of more fundamental purposiveness?" Rahman, then,
argues that Faith in God 'Ys stronger, than many pieces of empincal but contingent
ahman man, Major Tkmes, 7. Rahman argues that the Qur'Zn aims at creating and
maintaining man's attitude within two extremes, i.e., "devoid of hope or devoid of necess'uy
humility." Further he postulates that it is for this reason that God is described as "Light of the
Heaven and the Earth" (Rahman, "The Qur'anic Concept of God, the Universe, and Man," IsImic
Studies6, 1 [1967]: 12-4). On the other hand, Ibn Srna interpreted this verse as having syrnbolic and
metaphorical significance. He did so in ordcr to expound what the Prophet received fiom his Lord.
He underst an& the term "niche" (misbkat)t O imply the mat erid intellect (alalCaaqll- bayÜIaOÏ) and
the rational sou1 ( d - n h al-nafiqab), while "Iamp" ( a h 3 d enotes the acquired intellect (alalcaqallmustafiis).
Ibn SinZ contended that "light" has a metaphorical meaning - either the good, or the
cause of the good. Thus, it is God, who is in Himselfthe good and the cause that leads to the good
(Ibn SimZ, E1rbbZt al-NubumZt, edited with introduction and notes by M. Marmura peirut: D5r
al-NahZr, 19691, 49-50. Mannura bases this edition on the text p ~ t e idn Cairo in 7Ef Rasa'd
(1908). Marmura's translation of this text can be found in Ibn Sina "On the Proof of Prophecies and
the Interpret at ion of the Prophet's Syrnbols and Metaphors," in Medeval Political Philosop& eds.
R. Lerner and M. Mahdi (Ithaca: Corne11 University Press, 1963), 112-21.
22?2ahman, M m T'emes, 8. See also p. 79.
81
ividence. For, it is much less reasonable - indeed, it is kational-- to Say that al1 this
gigantic and lasting natural order is pure hanc ce.''^^^
It is true that Rahman employs these philosophical expressions, such as Self-
Necessary, pure emptiness, light and darkness, pure chance, and cont ingency, to analyze the
Qur'anic concept of God and nature. This, however, does not mean that he holds ail of thern
in high esteem. His criticism of the view that the universe is a product of chance -- which
suggests the etemity of the world - is a clear indication of his disagreement. Furthermore,
he clearly states t hat in the matter of "the rnetaphysics of creation, the Qur'in simply says
that the world and whatever God decided to create in it came into existence by His sheer
cornmand: 'Be Y. " 23 1
Furthemore, Rahman rejects in essence the Muslim philosophers' conception of
God. In his view, these philosophers took the Hellenized idea of God as "a principle which
'explains' this world, rather than a Creator who directs this world; as an intellectual
formula rather than as a moral and dynamic imperative?' His criticisrn of the eternity of
the world is therefore apparent. By discussing these terms and expressions, Rahman hopes
to correct these conceptions and to offer an alternative understanding of the concept of God
%ahman, Major Ziema$11. See also F. Rahman, "The Message and the Messenger," in
Islm: Tbe Relig'ous md Politicai Life of a World Commmit- ed. M. Keiiy (New York: Praeger
Publications, 1984), 43; Rahman, 'Fazlur Rahman," 156, and Rahman, "The Qur'Znic Concept of
God," 17.
232~ahmank,la tluc MethodoIogy, 124. See &O Rahman, "Fazlur Rahman," 155.
82
and of nature in the ~ ~ r ' i i n ? ~
Moving on to the subject of man in the Qur'Zn, one should note that Rahman's
discussion is in two separate parts - man as individual and man as society. In the first part,
Rahman criticizes the mind-body dualism of Greek phüosophy, Christianity, and Hinduism.
He argues that the Qur'in never speaks of man as being composed of two separate
substances, the body and the s ~ u lIn. ~Ra~hm an's understanding, the term oafs, often
=fThe question of the origin of the world has preoccupied many thinkers throughout history.
In Islamic history, there was heated debate between Muslim philosophers on the one hand, and the
"orthodox," represented by al-Ghazali, on the other. Most Muslim philosophers, such as Ibn Sn;,
argued that the world is etemal, and hence, not created. This belief stemmed fkom their
understanding of the concept of natural causation in which the world proceeds from God's essence
by the necessity of His nature. Since Ibn Sina believed that God is eternal, the world must also be
eternal (Ibn Sini, a(-Na/Zt rairo: Matbacat al-Sasdah, 19381,2545). In contrast, al-GhazaG refuted
Ibn Sina's view on the eternity of the world. Part of his argument is that the world was brought into
existence by the Eternai Will, which called for its existence at the tirne it came to exist. The world
was not created earlier because its existence had not been willed eariier (al-GhazZG, T ' Z u t al-
FalaSifa6, 53-4). This debate was later continued by Ibn Rushd, who answered each of al-GhazZfi's
arguments in order to defend Ibn Sina's position (Ibn Rushd, T a b a t al-Thhifut, ed. M. Bouyges,
3rd. ed. [Beirut: Dar eLMachreq, 1992), 4-1 17). One of the important secondary sources on Ibn
Rushd's t heory of creat ion is Barry Kogan's A verroes aod the Metaphysics of Causation (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1985). For a discussion on the controversy between al-GhazZ and Ibn Snâ on YmiF
and ta'wyi consult Iysa A, Bello, B e Medeval I'sIarmC Controversy between Phr'losophy and
Qrthodoxy: Ijma' audTaYv2iln the Conffict between Al-GhazaGandlbo S n >G eiden: E. J. Brill,
1989), 84-1 10. For further reading on the debate between al-GhaziiG and Ibn Rushd on the creation
of the world, see 0. Leaman, An htroducfion ta MecCevdhIarmc PhiIosoppby&ondon: Cambridge
University Press, 1985). Not al1 Musiim philosophers, however, subscribed to the notion of the
eternity of the worid. Al-Kin&, for example, rejected Aristotle's theory, and argued that the world
was created in tirne (RasZYlal-Ki'nd7al-Falsdyabe,d . M. A. H. Abu Edah [Cairo: Mafbacat al-
Rirnad, 19501, 197-8,202-7).
2x~ahrnan, Major Themes, 17. He argues that the Qur'Zn "does not hold that a heavenly
soul and an earthly body somehow corne together in uneasy union or bond whence the soul seeks
release as soon as possible" (Fazlur Rahman, Hedfh andMedicine h the hIanuc Tradition pew
York: Crossroad, 19891, 21). See also his "Islam and Health: Some Theological, Historical and
Sociological Perspectives," Hamdardhiarm'cus 5,4 (1982): 75-6. Rahman, however, realizes that
in Islamic history, mind-body duaiism was accepted by Iater orthodox Muslims, particularly after
a l - G h d and through his influence (Rahman, Mqor nemes, 17). Al-GhazZ's writings, especially
Tahfit al-FalZsifab, which takes up the subject of resurrection, refer to mind-body dualism as an
accepted reality.
mentioned in the Qur'in, should not be translated as soul; rather, it means "person" or
"self." Accordingly, the phrases al-oafs al-mqtma 'hm& and al-oafs ai-lawwihah should
be understood as "states, aspects, dispositions, or tendencies of the human per~onality.''~~
Et is interesting to note that in his treatment of the Qur'anic concept of man, both
as individual and social being, Rahman does not employ m a .ph ilosophical expressions.
Indeed, apart fiom the mind-body dualism, no such expressions can be found. One may
wonder why this should be so. One explanation may be Rahman's insistence on rnorality,
which colours his view of the concept of man in the Qur'Zn. In this sense, Rahman tries to
bring the discussion on man into the practical realm, since "the goal of man-in-society is
to build an ethically-based order on the earth but that cultivation of taqwZor a true sense
of responsibility is absolutely necessary for man-as-individual if such an order is to be
built
Issues surrounding prophethood and revelation occupy a large part of Rahman's
discussion. In this treatment of the subjects, Rahman does not merely refer to M@am.mad;
he examines prophecy in Islam in general. He regards prophets as "extraordinary men" who
have "sensitive and impregnable per~onalities."I~n~ h is view, these prophets or human
235~ahmanM, qor memes, 17. In Rahman's understanding, "A person is not just the outer
body, the 'physical M e , ' but includes an inner person which rnay be called 'mind'; together they
form one organized unit" (Rahman, Healîh aodMedicioe, 21). See dso Rahman, 'Tslam and Hedth,"
75-6.
Z36Rahman, Major Themes, 106. Tamara Sonn rightly points out that for Rahman "Mly
human interpretation is expressed in actions, not in words; the interaction with the text is not
complete without its behavioural manifestations. The behaviour is, in fact, the interpretation of the
words" (SOM, 'cFazlur Rahman's Existential ~ermeneutic," unpublished paper delivered at the
conference "Islam and Modemity: The Fazlur Rahman ~x~e r i enc eI,s"ta nbul, February 1997).
237~ahmanM, @r Themes, 80.
84
messengers are "recipients of some special or extraordinaiy power which ernanates fiom the
ultimate source of all being and which f i s the hearts of these prophets with something
which is light whereby they see and know things the way others are not able t ~ . " ~ ~
In discussing the question of the mfraJi, or the ascension of the Prophet, Rahman
enters the longstanding debate on whether this was a spiritual or physical joumey. He
argues that the Prophet's mfra/was spiritual in nature and not physical-locomotive, since
the Qur'Zn clearly states: "his heart did not lie about what it sa^.'^^^ Yet, he holds that
'khen a spiritual experience is of great intensity, where the distance between subject and
object is almost completely removed, 'voices' are 'heard' and 'figures' 'seen' by the subject
and the inner experience takes on a quasi-concrete f~rm.''~'~
On the whole, Rahman's description of the prophets as recipients of an
extraordinary power which emmates fiom the ultimate source of al1 being shows its
closeness to Muslim philosophers' understanding of prophecy in Islam. However, he does
not discuss the intelligences which emanate fiom the Active Intellect. He emphasizes more
Ug~ahmanM, ajor Themes, 98.
akahman, Major îZemes, 92-3. In discussing verses 535-1 8 of the Qur'iin, Rahman argues
that they refer to five things: "(2) that the reference is to experiences at two different times; (2) that
in one experience the Prophet 'saw' the Angel of revelation at the 'highest horizon,' and he
possessed extraordrnary, almost suppressive strength, while on an earlier occasion he had 'seen' him
at the 'furthest lote-tree -where the Garden of Abode is located'; (3) that instead of the Prophet
'going up' in Ascension, in both cases the agent of Revelation 'came down', (4) that the expenence
was spiritual and not physical-locomotive: 'his beatdid not lie about what it saw'; (5) finally, tbat
these revelatory experiences involved an expansion of the Prophet's self by which he enveIoped al1
reality and which was totd in its comprehensive sweep --the reference in both cases is to ultimate,
be it the 'highest horizon' or the 'furthest lote-tree'" (Rahman, Major Zï~emes, 92).
240~ahmanM, mr Bernes, 93. See Rahman's discussion on al-mifoal (realm of
images) wherein he discusses the possibility of the Prophet to contact the unsees both in waking iife
and in dreams, and how the doctrine was mderstood in the history of Islamic philosophy (Rahman,
"Dream, Imagination," 167-80).
the human aspect of the Prophet, who, despite his supenorïty, remains h~man.~In~ '
Rahman's opinion, "'M~ammad's prophetic career was likewise geared toward the moral
improvement of man in a concrete and communal sense, rather than toward the private and
met aphysicaI."242
Yet one may still wonder why Rahman was so preoccupied with whether the rm'rq
was a spiritual or a physical journey. The controversy may be traced back to the Muslim
philosophers' doctrine of the ascension. Some philosophers believed that M&ammadYs
mfr@ was spiritual, since they thought it impossible for a human being to achieve
ascension. Other philosophers argued that ascension was both a physical and spiritual
jomey. In his Caf. Fakhr al-Diu al-R-Ei argued that it was "rational" rather than physical.
24 1 Rahman, Major Themes, 89. In the history of Islamic philosophy, Muslirn philosophers
such as al-Fâribi and Ibn S n i discussed the concept of prophecy at great length. Their concepts are
rnainly based upon Greek theories of the soul - as expressed, for the most part, by Anstotle in the
third book of De Anima ( B e Worh of Mstotfe, tram W.D. Ross [Oxford: Clarendon Press,
193 11). In this respect, the concept of emanation of the intelligences is very central. In al-Farabi 's
view, when human intellect becomes c'self-intelligible" and "self-intellective," it becomes "acquired
intellect" (d-caqlm~tafad)( al-Farabi, Risala6 fialalcAg/,e d. M. Bouyges [Beirut: Dar el-Machreq,
19831, L9-20; and al-Farabi, al-SyaSâb d-Madm7yah PCDar al-MaCZrif, 1345H.],49). This notion of
aACaql al-must&d actually served as a basis to exphin the existence of the Prophet. Al-Farabi
argues that in a few cases when the al-must~dcontemplates the Active Intelligence, the
Active Intelligence becomes the form of the 'aqlal-mustfidand "the perfect philosopher, or Imam
(al-falasÜYwa al-ra 7s al-awwrilr) or the Legislat or (al-malik) cornes int O existence" (al-Fàrabi, T.sjï
al-Sa'Zdaà, PZr al-Macarif, 1345H.],43). See also Rahman, Prophecyin Ham, 14. In al-FZrZb7's
view, however, the Prophet shouid go through the stages of ordinary philosophical thought before
at t aining revelat ion (al-Fârab?, al-SyZs&, 49; and al-FZrEb?, AbFarabi on t-he Peri5ect State: Abu
~ ~ a l - ~ ~ i b 7 ' s ~ a o a ~ ~ ~ 2 h l&a-Fli&- ~ aa rdev~isleda tebx t with introduction, translation,
and cornmentary by R. WaIzer [Oxford: Ciarendon Press, 19851,242-5). Ibn SinZ shared this view.
The difference between his and al-Farabi's notion lies in Ibn SnZ's argument that the capacity to
receive intelligibles directIy in the ordinary human soul must exist essentially in the angelic intellect
(al-CaqI al-malakrJ, which receives emanat ions fkom the active intellect wit hout mediat ion. Thus,
prophetic revelation is something which happens "dl at once" (dafatan) (Ibn Sni, Avicenna's De
Aru'ma: (Arabic text): BerRg the Psychofogikal Part o fK itab af-shifiM aqâlah 5, Chapter 2, ed. F.
Rahman pondon: Oxford University Press, 19591,249). Rahman discusses these two philosophers'
noetic in detail in his book Propbecyh hfm.
242 Rahrnaa, Islam and Modemity, 2.
Based on verse 11 of surah 53, al-RZ held that M.ammad saw God with his heart, not
his eyes. This implies that he came closer to God in a spintual sense. Al-Râ6 concluded
that Mdgmmad, in his spiritual ascension, reached the highest station of certitude, beyond
which there is none greater." Another thinker, Haydar L u r i (d. 1385),245c onfended that
the ascension could be both physical (al-mfr* al-suwan) and spiritual (al-lfürâj alma'oaw).
It cm be physical because it is impossible not to accept the fact that perfect men
could possess special powers. On the other hand, the mfre cm be spirituai, since it needs
no physical m~vement.*~In' this sense, Rahman's explanation remains unique, since he
argues that "the Qur'in not ody does not speak of a physical ascension of the Prophet but
even describes it as an 'act of the heart'; and in two places, far fiom speaking of the prophet
as ascending, it speaks of God as descendhg to him."246
The last topic to be examined here is eschatology. In Rahman's view, the Qur'in
243~akharl- Din al-RZ, a(-Tafcd-Kabk vol. 28 (Beirut: DZr IhyZ' al-TurZth al-'Arabi,
1980), 286-94.
2 4 ~ a h ~al-'D in Haydar b. 'Ali a l - b u l i was an early represent at ive of Persian t heosophy
and a commentator of Ibn 'Arabi. He combined "SE9 convictions hereditary in his family with an lis and Persian sX tradition strongly imbued with the ideas of Ibn 'Arabi." Among his treatises
are: 'c.Emiacl- Asriir wa Manba' al-Anwiir" in La PMosop6ie Shfite, ed. Osman Yahya and Henry
Corbin (Tehran-Paris, 1969), 2 ff; see also &LG, Nkg al-*@, a comrnentary of Ibn 'Arabi F ~ f g
al-@km, ed- O. Yahya and H. Corbin (Tehran-Paris, 1975) (Josef van Ess, Haydar-i &LIE," Efi.
245~ayda&rn ul?, As% d-Shd& wa A&. al-Tk?qah wa Aa w* al-Haq7qah (Tehran:
Cultural Studies and Research hstitute, 1983,) 158-61.
246Rahman, 'The impact of Modemity," 122. He refers to the process of receiving
revelation: "although the standard revelatory experience of the Prophet was a matter of the 'heart',
this experience nevertheless automatically took the form of words, as is the case with al1 spiritual
experiences of great intensity" (Rahman, Majr memes, 93). For a discussion on the Prophet's
manner of receiving revelations, see among others: Rahman, hIm, 30-3; Rahman, "Some Islamic
Issues in the AyyÜb Khan Era," in Essays on hIarmë Civilizatioo, ed. D. P. Little (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1976), 299-302; Rahman, 'Divine Revelation and the Prophet," Hmdardlsamicm 1,2 (1978): 66-
72.
does not tdk about the destruction of the universe, but rather about "its transformation and
remangement with a view to creating new forms of life and new levels of being.7'247A s
with his views on the ascension of the Prophet, Rahman maintains that even if the Qur'ih
seems to convey a physical conception of Judgment Day, the actual reward or pimishment
will be mord or spiritual, not just physical. Rahman disagrees with the Muslim
philosophers who argued that the Hereaft er wiU be filled by disembodied souls, and that the
Qur'anic verses which speak of physical happiness and physicd hell are purely
met aphorical. In fact, as Rahman insisted earlier, the Qur' Zn does no t recognize the dualisrn
of the soul and the body."
In view of the above, Rahman's insistence on the transformation of the world on the
Day of Judgment contradicts his view on the creation of the world, since "transformation"
-- as opposed to "destruction" -- illustrates the etemity of the world. In a transformed
world, "new forms of life and new levels of being" will be created, and this clearly suggests
the etemity of the world. There is, however, one possible answer that Rahman might have:
in his expianation of the transformation of the world, he does not claim that the new forms
of life and new level of being will be transformed into another world. On this point,
Rahman is of the opinion that the world simply is not etemai.
On the question of whether the Hereafter wili be filIed with the disembodied souls,
247~ahmanM, ajor Themes, 11 1 .
m~ahman, Major îaemes, 112. In his words: "although the QurY%, particularly in the early
and middIe Meccan penods, persistently de t ails the horrors of the Judgment Day for evildoers, the
real punishment will undoubtedly be the irremediable pain suffered by those who have perpetrated
evil in this life when they realize that there is no 'going back' and that they have lost the only
opportunity in the life of this world to do good" (Rahman, Majr Tbemes, 108).
Rahman adopts a cntical attitude. He criticizes the theory advanced by the Muslim
philosophers of the non-resurrection of the body in the Hereafter by arguing that the actual
reward or punishment will be moral or spiritual, and not just spirit~ al .2T~'o quote Rahman:
The Qur' &, therefore, does not a f k n any purely "spiritual" heaven or hell, and the
subject of happiness and torture is, therefore, man as a person. When the Q u r k
speaks -- so repeatedly, so richly, and so vividly -- of physical happiness and
physical heu, it is not speaking in pure metaphor, as M u s h philosophers and other
allegorists would have it, although, of course, the QurYZnis trying to describe the
happiness and prmishments as effects, Le., in lems of feeIingof the physical and
spiritual pleasure and pain. The vivid portrayals of a blazing hell and a garden are
meant to convey these effects as real spiritual-physical feelings, apart fiom the
present psychological effect s of t hese descript
C. The Application of Rahman's Methodology
In the view of Rahman, contemporary problems cannot be solved by relying on
conservative, medieval theories, since one needs knowledge in order to cope with advances
in science and technology. On the other hand, one has also to beware of Western influence,
2 4 9 ~ hMeu slim philosophers' arguments concerning bodily resurrection in the Hereafter
sternmed fiom the concept of the dualism between mind and body. Ibn Sina argued that "The soul
achieves its first entelechy through the body; its subsequent development, however, does not depend
on the body but on its own nature ... the soul does not die with the death of the body and is
absohtely incorruptible" (Ibn Sina, al-NqZt, 185. This English translation is t aken from Rahman,
Avicema 3 Psychology. An English translation of Kitab al-Njit, Book 17; Chapter VI pondon:
Oxford University Press, 1952],58). As in the case of the origin of the world, al-Ghazali attacked
Ibn Sina's argument on the ground that the Iatter's concept was against the QurYZnicte achings. Al-
Ghazali contended that in the time of Truth, the body and the soul will be joined together. He
argued that one can interpret rnetaphorically the verses giving human attributes to God. The
description of Heaven and HelI, however, is very clear and leaves no room for metaphorical
interpretations. Thus, punishment and reward in the Hereafter are, as described in the QurYZnic
verses, both physical and spiritual (al-Ghazali, Ta6ai"Ut al-Falisif&, 288-9, 298). In this rrnse,
Rahman's position may be analyzed fkom two perspectives. On the one hand, his view of the
supremacy of spintual reward or punishment is close to Muslim philosophers' contentions. On the
other, Rahman's insistence that physical punishment and happiness are literal, not metaphoncal, is
close to al-GhazZG's position.
since the danger of neglecting human and moral values is closely tied to technological
development. Rahman's solution is to retum to "the pure Islam of the Quran.'"'
As discussed earlier, Rahman's emphasis on the importance of moral order on the
earth is to be found in almost all of his writings. Chapter one of this thesis, in which he
explains the elements of his philosophy, contains a discussion of 221a, co ncept which
combines doctrine with act. It is this cal1 for combining theory and action which appears
t O characterize Rahman's book Major Themes as well as his other works. Basing himself
on a logical approach and proper understanding of the moral ideal of the Qur'ik, Rahman
tries to respond to the problems of the contemporary world."'
In Majr n e m , t he very k t th eme he discusses is the Qur'Zn's concept of God.
Rahman insists that the Qur'Zn addresses human being, referrhg to itself in fact as
"guidance for ~nankind."T~h~is has both a practical and a political application; indeed
Rahman insists that the Qur'Zn 'bas not a mere devotionai or personai pietistic t e ~ t . " ~ ~
Thus, the Qur'k is not a "treatise about God and His nature," even if it speaks about Him
at almost every tum. In the Holy Book, therefore, God's existence is "strictly fimctional --
ZS1~ahma'Tna, zlur Rahman," 1158-9. See aiso Fazlur Rahman, "Perception of Desirable
Societies in Different Religions: The Case of Islam," unpublished lecture presented at United
Nations University (Bangkok, March 12-5, 1984), 1-4.
%ot ail themes discussed by Rahman in this book will be analyzed. In order to discem his
unique methodology, those elements of his views which reflect the application of his methodology
will be discussed. The discussion and examples will be taken mainly fiom this bock, although his
other treatises which relate to the impIementation of his methodology wiil also be assessed.
U3~ahmanM, ajor nemes, 1,3. See also Rahman, Hm mdModemity,2 .
m ~ peost dates that the Qur'ân, together with the Prophet, holds the position as "a unique
repository of answers to d l sorts of questions" (Rahman, andModemit' 2).
He is Creator and Sustainer of the universe and of man.''255
Rahman regrets the fact that many Western scholars portray the Qur'dc God as
"a concentrate of pure power, even as brute power -- indeed, as a capricious tyrant."256 He
realîzes that the Qur'iin speaks about God in many diEerent contexts. While it is true that
the Qur'in sornetimes depicts God's power, it equaily discusses His "infinite rner~y."~~'
Here lies the importance of understandhg the moral conception of the Qury in, which
cannot be achieved through a verse-by-verse approach.
Godys power is closely related to the notion of qadq "measiiring," which is often
misunderstood as the blind detemiinism of alI human acts, since the Qur'ân (77:23) seems
to state clearly "So We determined [these laws] and how fine measurers We are." Rahman
postdates that as a Qur' S c te rm, the word qadar actually "'measures out' everything,
bestowing upon eveqdhing the range of its potentialities, its laws of behaviour, in sum, its
c h a r a~t e r . "T~a~ki ng the example of producing a test tube baby, Rahman applies a strict
logic, yet sticks to the moral ideal of the Qur'àn stating:
This [verse 77:23] in itseIf does not mean that man cannot discover the laws of the
process whereby a sperm and an egg meet and then, at a certain temperature and
256Rahman, Mqor TBemes, 1. One example of the contemporary Western depiction of God
in the Qur'En is provided by Michael Cook: 'ne is etemal - He has always existeci, and aiways wiu.
He is omniscient: not a Ieaf falls without His knowledge. He is omnipotent: when He decides
something, He has only to Say 'Be!' and it is. Above dl, He is unique: He is one, and there is no
other god but Him, He bas no partners in His divinity. Furthemore, He is mercifd mi beneficent
-but for reasons we shali corne to, He is frequently angry" (M. Cook, M&ammad[Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 19831, 25).
x8~ahmanM, ajor Themes, 12. See also Rahman, "The Qur'inic Concept of God," 6.
with certain materials and other conditions, produce a perfected baby; and then
apply those laws to produce a baby in a tube, for example. Many people think that
this is ' m g with" God and trying to interfere in Kis work and share His divinity,
but the real worry is not that man is tryïng to displace nature or imitate God, for
man is encouraged to do so by the Qur'an- The fear, on the contrary, is that man may
"vie with" the devil to produce distortions of nature and thus violate moral la^.^^
In his discussion, Rahman does not refer to all the Qu.'-%ic verses concerning God.
Instead, he anaiyzes the concept of God in the QurY%. He identifies the basic principle
behùid this concept and, fiom there, analyzes the moral ideal of those verses. Rahman
reiterates that a selection of any number of verses fiom the Qur'Gn wiU yield a partial and
subjective point of view. Studying it as a concrete unity, however, will dow it to emerge
in its fullne~s.~~*
It is clear fiom his discussion of the concept of God that Rahman's idea of
monotheism is the "foundation-stone" of the discourse. A proper understanding of the
concept of God in the QurYani,n tirm, leads to the human capacity of avoiding all kinds of
"spiritual dnigs," so common n~wadays,'~' because "it is the moral aspect of man's
z%ahrnan, Major nemes, 13. Rahman verifies and gives a specific example of the use of
the tenn qadar: 'When a certain car, for example is manufactured to nui for a maximum estimated
at 150,000 miles, then the power to nm so much, which is inlaid in it, is caiied its taqdi~T: his taq&
brings it about that this car, which is an automobile vehicle of a certain type, will not, e-g., be able
to fly like an aeroplane, that it will be able to nm faster than a man, etc." (Rahman, "The Qur'anic
Concept of Gocl," 6). Consequently, in Rahman's view, there could be no objection in Islam to "testtube
babies," if the union is between the genes of husband and wife. However, it should be realized
that ''this unique opportunity also carries with it grave and unprecedented nsks." He further argues
that "Perhaps it is this fact that renders this opportunity pregnant with both trernendous possibilities
and an unprecedented oppoarmity for moral training and maturity for human kind" (Rahman,H ealh
andMediche, 108). In Rahman's view, however, the advance of howledge should be in accordance
with the moral perception to avoid the abuse of its application (Rahman, Mqor Themes, 34).
260Rahman, Major nemes, 15.
26L~ahmaMn,a jor Tbemes, 16. la Rahman's view, once a person loses contact with God,
the next step is to fa11 into one of two conditions: to worship "one's own [subjective] desires" or
behaviour which is most slippery and difficult to control and yet most crucial for his
sw
With respect to man as individual, Rahman argues that human's t ask is to create a
moral social order on earth?3 It is true that the Qur'in recognizes human weaknesses, and
even the weaknesses of the prophets and the Prophet Muhammad himself. Human beings,
however, should actively try to overcome these weaknesses and not just passively accept
thern? In tthis regard, Rahman criticizes the fataüsm allegedly espoused by the Ashcarite
school, as weil as the SX teachings on "pantheism." He feels these tenets run against the
Qur'anic idea of qadar. It is ciear, in Rahman's view, that the concept of a blind fatalïsm
pre-determining all human acts is not Qur' -de; for, in reality, the QurY5nd iscusses the terni
qadarwith an optimistic o ~ t l o o Hke~re~ R~ah man, once again, emphasizes the importance
of taqwE "the unique balance of integrative moral action.'""
to woship "socialized desires." Rahman firmly believes that "when man's mord vision is narrowed
and the transcendental dimension is gone, then, h mth e universdy objective moral point of view,
it is immaterial whether one worships oneself as God or one's society or nations as God [pace Emile
Durkheim!]" (Rahman, Ma/or Tbemes, 27-8).
263~ahrnaMn, ajr Tbemes, 18 .
2"~ahman,M ajor ~ eme s1,8 . In Rahman's words: "It is this deep-seated moral fact that
constitutes the eternal challenge for man and renders his life an unceasing moral struggle. In this
struggle, God is with man, providedman makes t6e oecess-y effort Man is squarely charged with
this effort because he is unique in the order of creation, having been endowed with fiee choice in
order to fulfill his mission as God's vicegerent" (Rahman, Major Themes, 18).
'%ahman, Major Bernes, 12-3,23. He fuaher discusses the difference between man and
other creatures: "The only difference is that while every other creature follows its nature
automatically, man ougbt to follow his nature; this transformation of the isinto ou@t is both the
unique privilege and the unique risk of man" (Rahman, Major nemes, 24).
2%ahman, Major Themes, 28.
Thus, a true understanding of the Qur'anic concept of man as individual should
encourage responsibility for one's behaviour, since the Qur'iin rejects the concept of
intercession.267 Indeed, a true understanding of the Qur7%c concept of inan as individual
makes people understand the long-range moral goals of the human endea~our.~"T he
problem of disorientation today, where people undergo a similar ritual day after day and
lose sight of their long-term goals, reflects the loss of such art understanding.
In discussing man in society, Rahman postdates that the aim of the Qur'ân is to
establish "a social order on earth based on et hic^."*^^ He argues further that this goal is
pointed out together with "a severe denunciation of the economic disequilibrium and social
inequalities prevalent in the contemporary commercial Meccan s~c i e ty. " 'T~h~e question
remains as to why the Qur'k continuously cnticizes economic disparities. Rahman
maint ains that this is because Yhey were the most difficult to remedy and were at the heart
of social distord.'"' It shouid be noted, however, that the Qur'Zn does not discourage the
267~ahmanM, ajor nemes, 3 1. See ais0 Fazlur Rahman, "The Status of individual in Islam."
IsIantlë Srudies 5,4 (December 1966): 320, and Rahman, "The Impact of Modemity," 122.
'6kahman, Major Themes, 3 7.
et ah man, M W Themes, 38. In Rahman's view, the Qur'Znic idea of social justice
includes a discussion of, among other things, economics, human rights, human equality, democracy,
and fieedorn. See his articles 'Tmplementation of the IsIamic Concept," 209-1 1; "Some Reflections,"
103-7, 115; "Islam and the Problem of Economic Justice," The Pakisfm Ecooom'st, 24 (August
1974): 14-39; "A Recent Controversy aver the hterpretation of Shg," Xisozy ofReiigions 20,3
(1 98 1); "The PrincipIe of S hua and the Role of the Ummah in Islam," in State, Politics and kim,
ed. Mumtaz Ahmad (Indianapolis: American Trust Publication, 1986), 87-96; "The Sources and
Meaning of Islamic ~ocidism," in Religooo and Political Modemization, ed. D. E. Smith (New
haven and London: Yaie University Press, 1974), 243-58.
94
eaming of wedth. The Qur'ân refers to wedth as "the bounty of God [f-lAl1&Jy' and
"good [ ~ ~ . " 2 H* o wever, in keeping with its criticism of economic disparities, the QurY&
reminds people to consider the needs of others; one of the weaknesses of man is his neglect
of these needs. It also reminds people to be wary of abusing wealth, since this 'prevents
man from pursuing higher ~alues."~"
In this, one finds a clear example of the application of Rahman's method of
understanding the Qur'k. The Qur'in teaches that 'kealth should not circulate only among
the rich" (59:7). The purposes of zakat are given in detail in 9:60, and include, in Rahman's
view, "ail the activities of a tat te.''^" Thus, for Rahman, zakatis ''a social welfare tax in the
widest possible meaning of 'welfare,'" and the only tax levied by the ~ur'iin."" In our own
day, when the needs of mankind have increased immensely, he argues that the rate of zakat
needs to be readjusted. Rahman disagrees with the c~lam2w, ho forbid any change of the
rate of z a . , and yet allow, instead, other taxes. Rahman claims that these 'ularnii' are the
ones "responsible for secularism in the Muslim ~orld.""~
In order to maintain economic balance in society, the Qur'in banned usury. Rahman,
"Rahman, Major nemes, 33-9- See aiso Fazlu. Rahman, ccEconomicP rinciples of Islam,"
ISIamr'c Sfudies8, 1 (1969): 2.
273~ahmaMn, W T hemes, 3 9. In Rahman's words: "However, without the establishment
of socio-econornic justice, it is inconceivable that the individuds of a society as a whole can
deveIop. Further, economic justice is the cornerstone even of social justice although, of course, social
justice is much more than that" (Rahman, "Economic Principles," 1).
'75~ahrnan",T he Impact of Modernity," 11 9.
276Rahman, "The Impact of Modernity," 1 19.
95
however, highlights the phrase which serves as the foundation for this banning -- i.e. that
usury "grows several-fold" (aq%fm mudg afab), threatening the public's welfare.
Nevertheless, one has to understand that under modem conditions, the role of banking has
changed. The term n3i: which was practised in pre-Islamic times and declared to be &zrM
by the QurYZn, does not have the sarne meaning or application as does bank-interest in the
context of a "developing econo~ny.""~
Rahman next considers how the Qur'Zn tries to strengthen the basic family unit, and
how it urges one to give truthful evidence, encourages good behaviour even towards one's
enemies, prohibits dissension and cliquing and imposes equality for the entire human race.
All these prescriptions are practi~al;'~ and are discussed within an ethical context and serve
as the foundation-stone of the discourse on man in society.
In his discussion of the social refonns advocated by the QurY%R, ahman argues that
one has to distinguish between "legal enactments and moral i n j u n c t i~n s .A'~s~ p~oi nted out
before, this distinction is centra1 to Rahman's method of interpreting the Qur' Zn. He t akes
the example of polygamy. First, one must understand that the permission for men to many
up to four wornen (3:3) arose in a context where there were many orphan girls, and where
the men who were the guardians of the orphans were ofien dishonest with the orphans'
properties. Second, one should note that another verse of the Qur'in (4: 129) clearly states
ahma man, Major Zïiemes, 40-1. For further discussion of nbZ', see Fazlur Rahman, "Ribâ
and Interest," Isiamrc Studies3, 1 (1964): 1-43. See also his works: Is~11221Mc ethdo/ogy, 67, 68,
79; hIam aadMudemi&, 16, 18,30, 127, 13; "Sorne lslamic Issues," 291-5; 'Islam uid the Problem
of Economic Justice," 3 1.
that T o u shall never be able to do justice among women, no matter how much you desire
to do so." Thus, for Rahman "The tmth seems to be that the permission for polygamy was
at a legal plane while the sanctions put on it were in the nature of a moralideal towmds
whico the society was expected to move, since it was not possible to remove polygamy
legaily at one str~ke."*~~
On the subject of nature, Rahman argues that the Qur'Zn regards the whole universe
as "Muslim," having surrendered to God's will. The case of man, however, is diEerent,
since people may choose to be or not to be ~ u s l i m .R~a~h'm an believes that the universe
is the primary sign (âyd) of its Creator. Nevertheless, when natinal causes impinge on
man's role, he tends to "forget" God. When they f d h im, he tends to "discover" ~ o d .It* ~ ~
28kahrnan, M@r IZzeznes, 48. Cases regarding the equality between men and women, the
Iaws of inhentance, and male vs. female witnesses should be understood in the same way by
allowing for the distinction between the legai specifics of the text and the ratio legis behind it. In
the case of equality between men and women, for exampIe, Rahman argues that verse 2:228 ("And
for women there are rïghts [over against men] cornmensurate with the duties [they owe men] -- but
men are one degree higher") does not suggest an inherent inequality between them. This is due to
the fact that in another verse (4:36), the Qur'Zn shows that men's superiority over women is only
functional, and not inherent: "Men are in charge of women because God has given some humans
excellence over others and because men have the liability of expenditure [on women]." That is why,
in the contemporary world, when wornen become economically self-sufficient, "the male's
superiority would to that extent be reduced, since as a buman, he has no superionty over his wife"
(Rahman, Major Themes, 48-9). Rahman was very much concemed with these issues, a concern
which needs to be interpreted in the Iight of his methodology of interpreting the QurY&. For his
treatment of these issues see bis articles: "The Controversy Over the Muslim Family Laws," in
South Asim Politics and ReIijgon, 414-27; "A Survey of Modemization of Muslim Family Law,"
htematioodJournaiofMddle East Studies2 (1980): 451-65; "The Status of Women in Islam; A
Modemist Interpretation," in Separate Wor.ds: Studes ofpwdab in South Asia, eds. H. Papanek
and G. Minault (Columbia: South Asia Books, 1982), 285-310; "Status of Women in the Qur'an,"
in Women mdRevoIution in ,!hm, ed. G. Nashat (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 37-54; and "The
Impact of Modemity," 120-2.
ahman man, Major Themes, 65.
is a matter of fact that most people think of the processes of nature as "having selfsufficient
causes." For many naturalists, for example, the universe is the ultirnate reality;
however, "they do not reaLize that the universe is a sign pointing to something 'beyond'
itself, something without which the universe, with al1 its naturai causes, would be and could
be n~thiog."*~~
Eschatology is another theme discussed by Rahman. The Qur'iin describes
eschatology in tenns of the joys of Heaven and the punishments of Heu. Human weaknesses
are selfish, narrow, and materiaily oriented. That is why the Qur'Zn terms the end of life as
al-ikbirah -- the "end7'or "the moment of t r ~ t h " *-- ~w~he n all deeds will be weighed. In
keeping with the responsibility of man as an individual being, each individual wül be alone
when facing his Maker on that Last Day. In this sense, the Qw7& encourages people "to
send something for the rnorr~w."~~~
Still on the subject of the Last Day, Rahman quotes the verse 6:94, which states that
it is the moral quality of one's actions that will remain with ~ i r n . 'Q~u~r' ânic descriptions
of that moment which show a cornplete dislocation of the earth, are, in Rahman's view,
only designed to show the absolute power of God. In fact, the Qur'in does not speak of "the
284~ahmaMn, i r T hemes, 106. Rahman fbther emphasizes that Yhe most fundamental
weakness of humans, for the Qur'an, is thrsir pettiness, narrow-mindedness, and selfishness. Even
their idolatry directly springs fkom pettiness of mind, for idol-worship presupposes the closure of
one's mind to the infinitude of transcendence" (Rahman, Health md Medicine, 12-3). See aiso
Rahman, "Islam and Health," 76-7; Rahman, "The Qur7Znic Concept of God," 12.
285~ahmaMn,a jor nemes, 107-8. See also Rahman, 'The Message and the Messenger," 44.
98
destnctioon of the universe but of its transformation and rearrangement with a view to
creating new forms of life and new levels of being.'"87 By realizing that life is a serious
matter wherein every body is responsible of what they have done, and that there will be a
continuation after this life, Rahman highlights the importance of developing taqwz the "inner torch which can enable one to distinguish between right and wr~ng."'