THE IINTERPRETATION
OF THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY
Rahman's underst anding of Greek thought led him to the conclusion that Muslim
philosophers were headed in the wrong direction because they were greatly influenced by
Heilenistic thought. Consequently, Rahman devoted great attention to IsIamic philosophy,
producing a number of important works in the field. Yet he is stiU regarded as a scholar who
was more concemed with the issue of revival and refonn in islam rather than with
philosophy. As Charles Adams has pointed out, this may be attr-ïbuted to the fact that
Rahman was not a constructive philosopher, in the sense that he did not offer his readers
a coherent philosophical system of his own. Adams finther points out that Rahman was less
an originator and propagator of philosophical ideas than a historia. of philos~phy."O~n~
the other hand, it may be argued that the issue of Islamic reform, which was of great
interest to Rahman, has, to date, generated more interest amongst Muslims than his
philosophical thought. Perhaps the reason for this is t hat Rahman's philosophical views
99~har leAs dams, "Fazl al-Rahman as a Philosopher," Journal of IsImc Researcb 2, 4
(1990): 226.
'%ahman's ideas on revival and reform in Islam cm be found in some of his essays. He
holds the opinion that the îdea of revival and reform in Islam, in its strict sense, cannot be attached
to the formative period of Islam. Both revival and reform occurred after the establishment of an
orthodoxy. He, however, argues that the eariy period is very important, because the major
developments of Islam can be traced back to the period after the death of the Prophet ("Revival and
Reform in Islam," 7ne Cambridge Ristory of Islam, vol. 2 B, eds. P. M. Holt, Am K. S. Lambton,
et al. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19801,632). Rahman further holds that it is moral
rather than theological factors which must underlie the revival and reform in Islam ("Roots of
Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism," in Change aadthe MmU'm WorId, eds. P. H. Stoddard, D. C. Cuthell,
et al. [Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981],24). Accordingfy, Rahman's approach to Islamic
reform should be distinguished from other approaches which atternpt to put Islam back into politics,
are usually considered separately fiom his other ideas rather than as a general fiamework
for his "Islamic thought ."
This chapter focuses on Rahman's interpretation of the history of Islamic
philosophy in three sections. Section one examines his own understanding of the
development of Islamic philosophy. Section two analyzes his religious beliefs and measures
their innuence on his interpretation of the philosophical tradition in Islam. Additionally,
it juxtaposes his historical and his philosophical thought. Special attention is also given to
those aspects of Rahman's methodology which distinguish him fiom other scholars. The
h a 1 section focuses on Rahman's preoccupation with the philosophical debate surroimding
essence and existence.
A. Fazlur Rahman's Underst anding of the Development of Islamic Philosophy
The birth of philosophical thought in Islam occurred, according to Rahman, in the
wake of the theological developments (kalam) of the eighth century. Although reason
civil law, or education. His approach lies in the critical assessrnent of the intellectual Iegacy of Islam
to understand its history, to differentiate its essential principle fiom its particular formulation, and
to determine the best way to apply it in the contemporary context; see Tamara Som, 'Tazlur
Rahman's Islamic Methodology," 226-7. In another work, Rahman divides the reform movements
in the Islamic world into four, namely: pre-modemist revivalisrn, classical modemism, neorevivalism,
and neo-modemism. He himselfspeaks for the last group; see his "Tslam: Challenges and
Opportunities," in Islam: Past hfluence and Present Challenge, eds. A. T. Welch and P. Cachia
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979),3 15-25. For an analysis of his thought on revival
and reform, see Alparslm Açikgenç, 'The Thinker of Islamic Revival and Reform," 232-48. As one
example of the influence of Rahman's neo-modernist ideas, many of his works were translated into
Indonesian in the early 1980s, and some prominent Indonesian scholars like Nurchoiish Majid and
Ahmad Syafii Maarif, who were Rahman's students at the University of Chicago, began to
incorporate Rahman's ideas in their wrïtings. Rahman hiniself was invited to come to Indonesia and
gave a lecture at the Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) Yogyakarta, hdonesia, entitled "Islam and
the Challenge of Modernity," August 1985. After his death in 1988, The Institute of Philosophy and
Religion (LSAF), Jakarta, presented a seminar on "Fazlur Rahman's Ideas," December 3, 1988.
played a pivotai role in kal& Rahman believed that it should be differentiated kom
philosophy, since the two had different emphases. Taking the Mu'tazilites as an example,
Rahman argues that they were theological rather than philosophical in orientation. The
Muctazilites tned to solve the moral problems of the Muslim cornmunity through
theological, rather than philosophical debate.'O1 This, however, does not mean that Rahman
supported their views, since he believed that the Mu"tlïtes %ad gone too far beyond the
limits which traditional Islam could recognize as valid," and "showed themselves as rigid
and intolerant advocates of Hellenic rationali~rn."~~~
On the other hand, Rahman regarded Islarnic philosophy as "a combination of
Aristotle and ~eoplatoni s~n. "A'~cc~o rding to him, while Muslim philosophers introduced
revolutionary concepts regarding contingent and necessary being and prophet hood ioto the
philosophical discourse, t hey also admitted "the general cosmological scheme" enshrined
in Greek thought. Muslim philosophers, such as al-Kindi, endeavoured to harmonize the
schism dividing philosophy fiom religion, a process which reached its peak with Ibn Sini's
(d. 1037) efforts to integrate "the traditional demands of the oahodox religion with the
10L~azlRuarh man, "Islamic Philosophy," in The Encyciupeedia ofPhiIosophoy, ed. by Paul
Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 4:219. Rahrnan fùrtlier argues that "the Mu'tazilah carried
their rationalism so far as to clairn parity for reason with revelation in the discovery of religious
truth" (Mam, 2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 119791, 90). One can debate the
argument that the Muctazilah7s approach was more theological ratlier than philosophical through
their concept of ethics. Although they accorded high status to natural reason as a source of ethical
knowledge, they could not avoid showing how the right and the good cm be understood by man
with unaided reason, and if possible, "to define what these were in their reality, independent of the
divine will." Thus, they discussed the question of moral issues in the context of theology, rather than
philosophy (Hourani, I'sIami'c Rationaiism, 3).
'"~ahrnan, Islam, 89-90.
'O3~ahrnan",I slarnic Philosophy," 220.
purely Greek rati~nalism."~"A vicenna's thought did not escape al-Ghazali' s harsh criticism
in T&&t al-Fal'ifah (hcohereoceo f the Pbilosopl~ers)a,~ r~eb~u ttd, which, to a certain
extent, put an end to the fdsafhh tradition. Under such conditions, philosophy in Islam took
the form of theosophic intuitionism 'tvhere it found a ready and secure home."'06 In
Rahman's view, ' k e do not get pure philosophy in Islam but a mystical phil~sophy."'~~
Nevertheless, he differentiates between philosophy and Süfism in the following:
While the purely intellectual philosophical tradition swived in the form of
comment aries or Iiandboo ks with the diEerent rhythms eit her as an instrument of
theology or its cntic, philosophy after al-GhaziiE developed in a new and
important direction which may be called a purely religious philosophy or
philosophical religion. This development, although profoundly influenced in its
course by Süfism and its modes of thought, is, nevertheless, to be distinguished
fiom the latter. ... For, the phenornenon we have temed philosophical religion,
although it often identifies its doctrines with those of the Süfis, especially of
speculat ive S üfism, is charact erized by rat ional argumentation and a purely
intellectual and logical thought-process while SÜfism relies exclusively on gnostic
expenence or intuition and uses poetic imagination rather than purely rational
pro cesse^.'^^
Rahman divides Süfisrn into two branches, one the early ascetic piety which arose
in the second century of Hijra as a reaction to the extemal development of the law, and the
other a variety which arose during the 3rd and 4th centuries and which favored the doctrine
of Gnosis (ma"rifah)','a n b e r experïential knowledge which it progressively came to
IWRahman, "Islamic Philosophy," 222.
loS~ditebdy Suiayman Dunyii (Cairo: ?sa al-Bab? al-Halabi, 1947). The English translation
is by Sabih Ahmad KamZ (Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 19%).
'%ahman, Islam, 144.
107~ahma"nIs, lamic Philosophy," 223.
oppose to the intellectual howl edge (Eih)o f theology ..."w Rahman's disdain for this
second form of Süiism is apparent in his writings. The Süfis, in his view, "claimed an
incorrigible way of homkgwhich was supposedly immune fiom error and, further, whose
content was utterly disparate in character with intellect ual knowledge." He further asserts
that the 'ecstatic statements' of Süfism are 'bot open to the scrutiny of ordinary avenues
of kn~wledge.""~
Rahman criticizes the SÜfi doctrine of d-&q?@ ('inner tmth'), because, in his
'%ahman, Ham., 141. He argues that the speed of development of Islamic law, which deals
mainly with the external behaviour of the human being, ied the Süfi movement to grow. For a
fiuther discussion on the development of Süfism through the centuries, see his "Revival and
Reform," 633-5, and Fazlur Rahman, "Islam," in n e Encyclopedia ofReLigrOn, ed. M. Eliade (New
York: -Macmillan, 1987), 7:3 13-16. Schimmel shares the opinion of Rahman that early ascetic piety
arose as an anti-govemment al attitude as early as the t ime of Hasan al-B @fi (d. 728). S he further
argues that in the ninth century different types of mystical tendencies and teachings emerged. The
roots of these movements, however, can be traced back to an earlier period. See her Mysticd
Dhensions ofIsIam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 30,41. For a detailed account
of the historical approach to SZsm, see Julia. Baldick, MysticdIsIam: h htroducrion to S&sm
(New York: New York University Press, 1989). Regarding the notion of ma'n'fab, Schimmel cites
the example of a Muslim mystic DhÜ7n-NÜn (d. 859), who was alleged to have a "philosophicalgnostic"
but not a philosophical approach to d e m g this notion. In his words: The gnostic becomes
more humble every hour, for every hour is drawing him nearer to God. The gnostics see without
knowledge, without sight, without information received, and without observation, without
description, without veiling and without veil" (Schimmel, MysticalDimetlsions, 43). Cootrary to
Rahman, however, Schimmel does not argue that this type of mystical teaching is opposed to
intellect ual knowledge.
lLO~ahmaHo, m, 141-2. At first glance, one finds that Rahman has a different
understanding of the character of the rater developrnent of SXsm fiom that of Nasr. Nasr holds the
view that, fiorn the sixtwtwelfth to the ninth/fifteenth centuries, both the Süfis and the Muslim
philosophers were concerned with the attainment of ultimate knowledge (S. H. Nasr, "Introduction
to the Mystical ~radition,"i n HistayofIslarmc PMosoph~ed s. S . H. Nasr and 0. Leaman, 367).
See also Nasr, 'TULysticism and Traditional Philosophy in Persia, Pre-IsIamic and Islamic," in The
Islm'c htellectual, 3-9. Upon closcr examination, however, one finds that Rahman has a similar
idea to that of Nasr, explaining that f?om the sixth/twelfth century onward, Süfism became a mass
movement, which, in some of its manifestations, not only worshipped at saints' tombs, but also
"looked like being simply a spiritualized version of IsmZIi esotericism, or a philosophical
dissipation of the orthodox position through inteilectual or pseudo-intellectual argument" (Rahman,
"Revivd and Reform," 634).
estimation, "many Süfis carne to hold that the seeker who arrives at this mystic tmth goes
beyond the Shan'a - the religious law, ofwhich he is no longer in need and which is meant
only for the masses and ne~phytes."'~T' he doctrine of monisrn (unity of being or w&dar
a l -~u j u ' d ) "h~e ld by Süfis represents a threat to the concept of the shhfi ah because, in
Rahman's words, it "obliterates al1 distinctions in the reai world which must serve as the
touchstone for the validity of any pr~position.'"'~M oreover, the ccpantheistic"c ontent of
"theosophic intuitionism," the new form of philosophy adopted afier ai-GhazZE7s attack,
brings to bear the extreme distinction between "Reason" and "Kasiif ':Il4 "New, whenever
"l~ahman, &fm, 143. Here, the difference between Rahman's understanding of the concept
of baq7qao and that of Nasr is apparent. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, Nasr argues that
the discussion of Islamic philosophy cannot be separated fiom the notion of baqLpli hdeed, to
understand the relation between Islamic philosophy and the sources of the Islamic revelation, one
must comprehend the central part played by the tenn (see nos. 50 and 51 of chapter one). For
Rahman, however, this concept is understood in a completely different way. He sees it as a way
understood by many Süfis to escape £iom the shGCah. On this point, Schimmel shares a similar
opinion to that of Rahman, stating that the wandering d e ~ s h eosr fiq71s played a considerable role
in discrediting Süfism by performing miracles and placing themselves beyond the law (br'shf)
(Sc hi rnmel, Mysticai Dimensions, 1 9).
"2~ahman understands the word "monism" in this context as wedat a/-wy*Gd(unity of
being). In discussing Sirhindi, he also uses the term monism to illustrate the doctrine of wedat alwujÜd(
see n. 1 16 below). Aziz Ahmad, on the other hand, argues that the Shaykh himself attached
two different meanings to this word, namely: ontological (w&dat al-wu/Ud) and phenomenological
(w@dat al-shuhü', and that Sirhindi attacked ontological monism (Aziz Ahmad, "Religious and
Political Ideas of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi," Rivista DegiiStudi 01ïkntali36 [1961]: 268).
113~ahmaIns,la m, 147. h t s u disagrees with the criticisrn directed towards w&dat alwujüd
He believes that the concept of wedat al-wyUd is "something which, if structurally
analyzed and elaborated in a proper way, will provide a theoretical fiamework in terms of which we
shall be able to clari@ one of the most finidamental modes of thinking which characterize Oriental
philosophy in general" (Izutsu, "An Analysis of W&& al- WwÜd Toward a Metaphilosophy of
Oriental Philosophies," in his Creation and the Timeless Order, 67).
' 1 4 ~d ictionary definition of "kashf' is 7 0 p ull away," "remove," "take off' (Ham Wehr,
Arabic-Engiish Dictio~atyu th aca: Spok en Language Services, 19 761, 828). Here Rahman does no t
give the definition of the tem; however, fiom the context of the discussion, it rnight be concluded
that he considers it to be a means of knowing, or a supra-rational system which cannot be altered
or destroyed, as opposed to imperfect knowledge.
40
the organic relationship between perceptive and fomulative reason is thus cut in a society,
it can never hope to keep alive any intellectual tradition of a high calibre."' l5
Discussing SirhincE's attack on the doctrine of w&dat al-wuj
that the Shaykh disagreed with the tenet both metaphysically and on the basis of his
mystical experience; "the former is directed against Ibn alskabi, the second against all
S Üfis who declare the unit ive experience to be the highest and truest fact of myst ic life.""6
Rahman supports Sirhindi's efforts to harmonize tqarvwuf and the shan'ah while
maint aining the latter's supremacy. l l7 He further credits Sirhindi with having made the first
serious and systematic attempt to address the subject in Islamic h i s t ~ r y . ~ ~ ~
sir ah man, IsIaauC Methodology, 1 15-6.
l16~azluRr ahman, "Introduction," 32. See also Rahman, "Drearn, Imagination and 'Alam
al-Mithal," klarmc Sfudies 4, 2 (1964): 177-8. It is interesting to analyze Sirhindi's opinion of
Süfism. In his early life, he joined the ChishtT order, and believed in wddat al-wujcd After the
death of his father, while on the way to hajj, he met the Naqshbandi saint KhwZjah 'Abdul BZqi (d.
1603), and joined his order. This order is stricter toward the shSCah in their suIük(traversing the
S i 5 way). Later, he criticized the doctrine of rnonism, which was very popular in India at that time,
as not being the tawfiTd of the Prophets. Consequently, he proposed the doctrine of w&dat aish&
Üi which would be compatible with the religion of the Prophet. This doctrine of Unity of Being
in vision, teaches that, in fact, the Unity of Being is only a matter of subjective perception (shubüd).
See Muhammad A. H. Ansari, Sdsm and Shan'&: A Study of Shaykh emad Sirhind's Effozt
to R e h SuiFsm (Leicester, UK: The Islarnic Foundation, l986), 1 1-7, and 10 1-1 7. For Sirhindi's
concept of ta w@d consult BurhZn m a d F-ârÜG, n e Mujdddid's Conceptioa of Ta w6id(Pakist an:
Tnstitute of Islamic Culture, 1989). For a detailed account of Sirhindi's works and his mystical
development see J. G. J. ter Haar, FoiIo wer a n d E r o ft he Prophet: Sbaykb A&md S i ~ h h d(i1 564-
1624) ars Mystic(Leiden: Het Oosters Instituut, 1992). Another usefùl work on Sirhindi is by Y.
Friedmann, Soaykb &milci Sirbiod: An Outline ofXs Thought and a Study of E s Unage in the
Eyes ofPosteri'ty(Montrea1: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1971).
117~ahmaIns,f ami'c Methodology, 11 7.
ahma man, "~ntroducito n," 43. To Rahman's min& Sirhinai's world-afnnning attitude and
his understanding of the Prophet's task '20 bring order into this temporal world of empirical
objects," is one of his greatest contributions to the discourse (Rahman, "Introduction," 52-3).
Moving on to the topic of zuhdt9 in Süfism, Rahman concurs with Sirhindi's
critique of its practice. in his view, its practice does not lead the S Üfis nearer to God but
rather in the opposite direction.120It is possible that some SÜfis who practice the doctrine
of zubd may think that the world is fùndamentdly evil, and choose to leave it. Rahman,
however, provides a coherent critique of the S Üfi predilection for the world-negation
d o c t ~-e- a doctrine which both the Qur' Zn and the sunnah deny:
For the Qur'ih and the Sm& had called upon Muslims to forgo comfort and, if
necessary, property "in the Path of Allah" Le., to build something higher and
positive - a socio-moral order. But the new Zdd taught the Muslim not to possess
anything; you obviously cannot forgo or spend anything which you do not
possess.12'
In shoa, Rahman laments the fact that in its development, some SÜfis failed to build
a moral-social order on earth: "Instead, we have the Shaykh and his authority, an endless
mythology of saints, miracles, and tombs, hypnotization and self-hypnotization and, indeed,
crass charlat anisa and sheer exploitation of the poor and the ignorant ." lu Rahman differed
from Nasr and Corbin on this point, who, as mentioned in the previous chapter, devoted
considerable time to gnostic thought in Islam. Rahman, by contrast, emphasizes the
importance of moral order and the importance of the sharTCah in the building of that moral-
I L 9 d~ ic tionary definition of "zubd' is "to abstain," "renounce," "abandon" (Hans Wehr,
Arabie-EngfisrSb, 383). Rahman does not define the term here; nevertheless, the context tells that it
refers to the doctrine of the world-negation.
l*~ahman,h faa21'c Meta~dofo~g1y1 ,7 . See n. 1 11 above, where Rahman argues t hat out aif
S X s perform miracles and worship saints and tombs. Thus, Rahman's criticism is aimed at those
who Ieave the world and shirk the responsibility of building moral-social order on earth.
social order; a task which, according to him, the Sifis neglected.lu
Fazlur Rahman, however, agrees wïth the aforementioned scholars in their
contention that Islamic philosophy did not cease to exist with the death of Avenoes. In The
Philosopby of Mulla Sadra he clearly st ates that the aim of the book is to "expose the
mythical character of the belief, generaily prevalent in Western Islamic scholarship, that
Islamic phüosophy 'died' after al-Ghazali's attack upon it in the eleventh century."'" Even
before Mulla S adrZ's time, during the 6th/l2th century, Suhrawardi had laid the foundation
of ''the mystic Philosophy of Illumination (@%mat al-lhiq)" as a rebuttal to the d o c t ~ e s
of Peripateticism. l"
l U ~fïtrs t glance, this argument seems to contradict Rahman's own criticism of the Muslim
thinkers who declared good and bad to be shdi as opposed to He, however, does not say that
the shafiCah is rniimportant. Hïs argument is aimed at the heavy emphasis on it and the negation of
the nature of the human being; see n. 84 of Chapter 1. Rahman's insistence on building a mordsocial
order on earth can be seen in many of his writings. On this point, his disagreement with some
S Ü f i practices is very clear: "Despite the fact that Sufism did take several rniddle of the road,
orthodox and quite sober forms, the massive injrnious effects of its uncontrolled expressions on the
body of the community cm never be overestimated. How does one square, for example, the insistent
QurY-hic call for est ablishing an ethicaiiy just and viable social order on the earth with the popular
Sufi practices which had no relation to the mord and material welfare of the Muslim community
as a whole" (Rahman, cbIslarn: Legacy and Contemporary," 239).
1 2 4 ~Raahm~an~, T he Phi~osophyofMulf~Sad(rAà lbany: S U N Y Press, 1975), vii.
ahman man, ?7ze PhiZosophy ofMd15 Sadra; 1. Shihiib al-Din Y ahya Suhrawad is wellknown
as the Master of Illumination (Shaykh al-IsdrZq). The Philosophy of Illumination is a
"distinct, systematic philosophical construction designed to avoid the logical, epistemological and
met aphysical inconsist encies which Suhrawardi perceived in the Penpat et ic philosophy of his day"
(Hossein Ziai, "Shihib aLDh Suhrawardi: Founder of the Rluminationist School," in Estory of
f i M c Phdosop& eds., S. H. Nasr, and 0. Leaman, 438). Ziai's article provides extensive
bibliographical notes on Suhrawardi, see also his "The illuminationist Tradition," in UIsfory of
~larm'cP~~osophebdsy.,, Nasr and Leaman, 465-96. For a detailed study of Suhrawardi's analyticd
thought see Ziai, Kiio wledge and L?luminatioa: A Study of Suhra wardZs @bat ai-1Shriq (Atlanta:
Brown University, 1990). Suhrawardi's most important work, @bat al-hhnZq, has been published
in Oewes philosophiques et mystiques: Opera Metaphysica et Mysfica a ed. Henry Corbin
(Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 1954). Maammad Iqbil has studied, £tom the philosophical point of
view, the epistemological foundation of the philosophy of illumination in me Devefopmeot of
Metaphysics in Penia (London: Luzac and Co.,1908). For a comparative study of Suhrawardi's
While it is true that philosophy in Mulla Sadrii's time was coloured by Penpateticneo-
Platonic doctrines, Rahman reasons that S adra's thought was quite distinct from the
intellectual and spiritual traditions of his t h e : "Our philosopher, having leamed the
wisdom of past philosophical traditions --the Peripatetic and the Illuminationist-- wished
to W t e a comprehensive work combining the wisdom of eariier masters with his own
intellectual in~ights."'I~n~ R ahman's opinion, SadG "searched for a method that would give
him certainty and would transfom merely rational propositions into experienced truths.""'
Sadri's theory of howledge was, in Rahman's estimation, a powerful comter to
the Peripatetic doctrine that "howledge cornes about by way of gradua1 abstraction of the
object of knowledge Eorn matter and its relationships until pure intellective laiowledge is
attained."i28 He also opposed the Süfi claim that mystic experience was devoid of any
mystical thought with that of cAynulqudEt Hamadhani, see Hermann Landolt, "Two Types of
Mystical Thought in Muslim Iran," ne Mwkm Worfd68 (1978): 187-204. For a discussion on the
1shrZq7schoo1, see Nasr, "ShihZb &D'in Suhrawardi," 372-98; Nasr, "The School of IspahZn," 904-
3 2, and Nasr, Tkee Musfi173 Sagay 5 2-8 2.
'26~ahmanT,h e Pbilosophy o f M d f i ? ~ &1-~2.
i27~ahmannye P hilosophy ufMulIiSa&< 3. Rahman's st atement that hlamic philosophy
after 51-Ghazali took on a new form, theosophic intuitionism --which emphasizes "rational
argumentation and purely intellectual and logical thought-process," and "carmot be hoped t O keep
alive any intellectual tradition of high cdibreW-- contradicts his appreciation of Mulla SadrZ.
Rahman himseifnotices that Sadr; possesses a distinct method in approaching Islamic philosophy
which, in turn, transforms the rational propositions into experienced tmths. Yet, it might be argued
that Rahman's overail judgment on the fonn of Islamic philosophy after al-Ghazali's attack was
written earlier in his book Is1a.m.i~M etlzodofogy Ia WIstov (1965), whereas a more positive
argument on Mulla Sadr; appeared in his later work Philosoplzy ofMullZSa&T(l975)T. hus, he
might find later in his study that SadrZ's was different fkom other philosophies adopted after al-
Ghazali.
L28~azluRra hman, "MullTi Sadri," in The Encyclopedia ofReIig-10~e~d . M. Eliade (New
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1987), 10: 151-2. See aiso Rahman, "Mulla Sadra's Theory of
Knowledge," P6iïosophica(Fonun 4 (1972): 141-52.
intellectual content. To Sadrii, "experience or intuition is needed not to produce new
thought-content but to bestow on this thought-content a quality of personal e~penence."'~~
Rahman, who was aware that Sadr: did not exert a great deal of influence in his lifetime, ''O
credited him with original thought and fett that he had successfully synthesized "ali
significant thought-currents of the entire heritage of Islamic thought."'''
In sum, Rahman regrets the fact that modern Westem students of Islamic
philosophy devote scant attention to the period following the death of Averroes. In
Rahman's mind, this state of affairs persists simply because Islam's earlier philosophicd
movement "'exerted an influence on medieval Westem philosophy until his [Averroes']
the-37132 He wams that the study of Islamic philosophical tradition fiom "the point of view
of its impact upon and relationship to Western philosophy" diminishes the integral body
of Islamic philosophy itself An even greater enor is committed, Rahman argues, by failing
12%hman, The Pbilosopby ofMullZSa&< 4.
L3?Rahman, "MullZ Sadr&" 152, and The PMosophy of MdlZ Sadr% 19. Rahman's
argument that SadrZ had little influence in his lifetime has some legitimacy, since some sources
show that it was his students, namely Mulla Masin "Fayd" KZshkT (d. 1680) and 'Abd al-Razzàq
L&ij? (d. 166 1) who gained prominence. See, among others James W. Morris, Tbe Wisdom of the
ïkone: An htroductin to the Phdosopby ofMu1Ia Saba (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1981), 46-7. Even though Nasr, in the two works mentioned below, does not discuss the influence
of Sacira during his lifetime, he does mention these two students as propagators of his works and
teachings in Persia and India. See S. H. Nasr, 'MuiiZ Sadrâ," in The Encyclopedia ofPhifosoph~
ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 5: 41 1-3; and Nasr, adral-D7n ShiriZmdbis
Trmscmdeot Zbeosophy (Tehran: Imperid Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1 W8), 3 8. Througliout
the eighteenth century, Sacira's treatises were kept alive by oral transmission. In Iran and
subsequently in the Indian subcontinent, his thought has ken taught for the past few decades. One
of the most infiuential commentators or interpreters of Sadr& doctrines was Mulla Hidi SabzawZ
(d. 1878). For a more detailed account on SabzawZ's life and his interpretation of SadrZ7s
philosophy, see fiut su, The Metaphysics.
' ahma man, The Philosopby of Mul; Sadr4 1 3.
L32~ahmacn'I,s lamic Philosophy," 223.
to give proper credit where the influence of Islamic ideas on Westem thought itself is
clearly evident . '33
B. Connecting Rahman's Religious, Histoncal and Philosophical Thought
In almost every written work, Rahman seeks to ground his scholarship in Qur'anic
precepts, stating plainly that "the entire fabnc of my belief rests upon the Quranic
tea~hing."'T~h~u s, the basis of Rahman's historical thought can cleariy be found in his
explication of Qur'anic rnethodology. According to him, the Qur'ih is not a 'book' for "it
was never forrnulated as a connected whole but rather was revealed to the Prophet
Muhammad, (peace of God be upon him) piecemeal as situations demanded.""*
Accordingly, the Qur'G should be understood against the background of its revelation.
Mecca on the eve of Islam provided a natural context for the Quf-%c message with its
social, econornic and political problems.
The method of Qur'inic analysis proposed by Rahman consists of a double
133~abmacncT, slamicP hilosophy," 223. ActuaUy the fact that modern Westem scholars do
not pay N1 attention to Islamic philosophy after ai-Ghazali's attack is not simply the result of its
lack of influence on medievai Western philosophy. It has much to do also with their understanding
of the meming of Islamic philosophy itself. When "Tslamic philosophy" is understood in its strict
or technical sense, strongly characterized by its Hellenic nuance, then it is understandable why there
has been scant attention paid to the subject after that period, since mmy believe that al-Ghazali in
his Tahafut al-Falasifah indeed put an end to ''Islamic philosophy."
ahman man, "Fazlur Rahman," 1 56.
135~azluRra hman, "Interpreting the Qur'an," hquiky3,5 (May 1986): 45.
ahman man, "Interpreting," 45. For further reading on Rahman's thought on the situation
of Mecca immediately before Islam, see Fazlur Rahman, 'Re-Foundation of the Muslim Community
in Mecca," Studia I s I m ï x 43 (1976): 5-24, and Rahman, "The Religious Situation of Mecca fiom
the Eve of Islam up to Hijra," Edmic Studies 16, 1 (1977): 289-301.
movement. In the e s t place, one analyzes the Qur'iin in the present and projects it back to
the t h e of its revelation. In the second, one moves in the opposite direction -- fiom past
to ~ r e s e n t . 'H~e~ f uaher elaborates these two movements in a detailed explmation:
The first of the two movernents rnentioned above, then, consists of two steps. First,
one rnust understand the import or meaning of a given statement by studying the
histoncal situation or problem to which it was the answer ... The second step of the
first movement, then, consists of understanding the meaning of the Qur'in as a
whole as weil as in terms of the specific tenets that constitute responses to specific
situations. The second step is to generalize those specific answers and enunciate
them as statements of general moral-social objectives that c m be "distilled" fiom
specific texts in light of the sociohistorical background and the often-stated
rationes legïk ' 38
Thus, Rahman holds that any examination of the meaning of the Qur'iin must
employ a historical approach, since the Qur'in "is Literally God's response through
Muhammad's mind" to a historically specific sett He cnt icizes Western Qur'Znic
scholars, such as John Wansbrough, for abandoning the historical method in their approach
to the Qur' in, a fact which has rendered them incapable of a coherent underst anding of the
Qur'Zn. Rahman disagrees with Wansbrough's thesis in particular, which states that "it [the
Qur'Zn] is a 'composite' work of several traditions" and hence c~post-Prophetic", because,
L37~ahmaIns l,a m and Modemit- 5. For further discussion on the "double rnovement"
method of interpreting the Qur'Zn and its application, see Rahman, "Interpreting," 45-9. See aiso
Rahman, "Translating the Qur'an," Re/igioo andLiterature 20 (1988): 23-30.
"8~ahman,I slam mdModemi'y, 6. Rahman does not explain the meaning of the term
"ratiooes le&' in this passage, He merely defines it as 'cCiUaat (-oub" (the reason behind the stated
Iaw) in his other work, "Tslam: Legacy and Contemporary," 242. In another work, he clearly defines
ratio legis as "the essence of the matter, the actual legislation being its embodiment so long as it
faithfully and correctly realizes the ratio; if it does not, the law has to be changed. When the
situation so changes that the law fails to reflect the ratio, the law mut change" (Rahman, Majr
Themes, 48). See also Rahman, "Interpreting," 48.
in Rahman's view, this thesis lacks "histoncal data on the origin, character, evaiuation, and
personaüties involved in these 'traditions.' Moreover on a number of key issues the Qur7&
can be understood only in tems of chronological and developmentai unfolding within a
single document
Moving on to the philosophical movement in Islam, Rahman maint ains that Muslim
philosophers had participated not only in the cultural efflorescence of Muslim civilization,
but in one of the most brilliant chapters in the history of human thought. That having been
said, however, Rahman criticizes Muslim philosophers for their heavy reliance on rational
activity which, he contends, contradicts the pillars of religious tea~hings.'~T' his
development is a consequence of the way in which Muslim philosophers such as Ibn S n i
sought to clariQ philosophical issues (for example, those pertaining to creation) through
a religious idiom. The conviction soon arose that there exists a parallel between
philosophical and religious truth, the "double tmth." Rahman criticizes both al-FZrZbi and
Ibn Sina for making the capital mistake of assimilating religious or moral tmth to
intellectual or "natural" tnith.'" In criticizing the ccdouble-tmth" concept, Rahman regrets
L%ahman, M+r îïjemes, xiii. A more detailed debate on this discourse between Rahman,
Wansbrough and Andrew Rippin will be discussed in chapter three in which an in-depth
understanding of Rahman's methodology in interpreting the Qur'ân is needed to c l a i e his unique
method. The discussion of his method here is merely given to place bis historicai approach into
context.
L41~ahmaInsa, mrc Metbodology, 1 19. An example of his critique cm be fomd in the
previous chapter in the course of the discussion of, what Rahman calls, the neglect by Muslim
philosophers of the field of ethics. See n. 62 of chapter one.
L4Z~ahmfabrnth er crit icizes the Muslirn philosophers for their misundersta nding of religious
truth: "for them, a moral principle is, in its cognitive aspects, exactly like a mathematical
proposition. They do not realize that religio-moral experience, although it certainly has a cognitive
element, radically differs eom other forms of cognition in the sense that it is full of authorityr
memingr and impenousness for the subject whereas ordinary form of cognition is simply
what he temis the lack of religious conviction and Islamic-minded initiative on the part of
Muslim philosophers.
This explanation typifies Rahman's methodologicd approach in his critique of
Muslim philosophers: first, he places their ideas in their histoncal context; second, he
contrasts these ideas with his interpret ation of those of the Qur' Zn. His insistence on the
importance of placing the historical scene "in the picture," when interpreting the Qur7&,
is clearly articulated in his account of Islamic philosophy. This is one example of how
Rahman's religious belief, which in this discussion undencores the importance of histoncal
specificity in the treatment of other disciplines, impacts upon his philosophical thought.
Tamara Som categorizes Rahman's Islamic methodology as, what modem thought
in the West calls, cchistoricism,"'43S he stresses that in the Islamic, as well as the Euro-
American world, historicism arose to revive Islamic society by "reapplying classic
standards."'" SOM distinguishes Rahman's Islamic methodology fiom that of other Muslim
informat ive ... Because of this failure to recognize t his difference and t aking t heir stand firmly on the
phenornenon of parallelism, the philosophers assimilated the Prophet to the philosopher, the
prophetic experience to intellectual cognition [plus, of course, the capacity to infiuence people,
which a philosopher does not possess]" (Rahman, IsIarm'c Methodology, 123-4). In this respect, as
when he criticizes Muslim philosophers' neglect of ethics, Rahman fails to put the discourse in its
context. It should be noted, once again, that the intellectual milieu at that time was entirely different
fiom that of Rahman. As an illustration of the Muslim philosophers' situation, see Joei L. Kraemer,
HuatauSm Ia the Reaaissmce ofhiam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), and Adam Mez, Renaissance of
Islam, tram. D. S. Margoliuth and S. Khuda Bukhsh (London: Luzac & Co., 1937).
143~amaSrao m, 'Tazlur Rahman's Islarnic Methodology," 227. A dictionary definition of
the term explains it as "the doctrine that kuowledge of human S a i n h as an i~educiblyh istorical
character and that there can be no ahistoricai perspective for an understanding of human natvre and
society" (Robert Audi, ed., The Cambridge Dictimary of Philosopliy (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), S.V. ''~istorïcisrn," by K. Nielsen, 33 1).
''%I Som's opinion, c'Histoncisrn began in the West in late nineteenth century in reaction
to a similar set of assumptions, and grew into the movement (s) now known variously as 'poststructuralism,'
'post-modemism,' and 'neo-historicism.' Proponents of this approach question a
historicists such as Muhammad Arkoun (b. 1928) and 'Abd Allah a L C M @. 1933). She
notes the fact that both use Western historicist terminology, Arkoun employing the term
"al-tiZ.jya,"L45al alcArw?c 'al-tz~aIu'yya,'ylw~ hile Rahman was a histoncist in a totaily
Islarnic idiom. In SOM'S view, Rahman's methodology "has roots deep within Islamic
tradition, roo ts which far predate Westem hÏstori~isrn~~"~~
Charles Adams argues that Rahman's approach to philosophy was far fiom being
histoncistic. At k t gl ance, this evduation appears to contradici SOM'S. However, when
one probes his argument further, it becomes clear that both scholars have arrived at similar
conclusions. Adams argues that in discussing a particular stream of thought, Rahman never
simply described nor sirnply reconstructed it. On the contrary, Rahman always sought to
enter into the spirit of the body of that thought. Rahman's understanding of the history of
range of the basic assumptions of formalism, but, in general, the term 'historicisrn' is used to refer
to the recognition of the impact of specific socioeconomic and political circumçtances on any given
cultural formulation, including the formulations that comprise religious heritage" (SOM, "Fazlur
Rahman's IsIamic methodology," 227).
14S~rkouann, Algerian thinker, is an Arab Muslim scholar who pays great attention to the
interpretation of religious and philosophical traditions through a hermeneutical method. From his
writings, it is clear that he is inspired by contemporary Western critical methodologies; see Fedwa
Malti-Douglas, "Arkoun, Mohammed," in ï'ïie 0,ufoz-d Eocycfopedia of the Modem Islamê World,
ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1 : 139. Arkoun attempts to represent
historicism in the Islamic world, arguing that Muslims should advance critical thought, since modern
ideologies take the place of traditional religions (M. Arkoun, Arab Thought, tram. J. Singh mew
Delhi: S. Chand & Co. Ltd., 1988],97).
'*~bd AU& al-'Ad (or 'Abdallah Laroui) is a Moroccan university professor concerned
with issue affecthg Arab-Islamic intellectual tradition. He argues that historicism, which COUXb e
regarded as a "means of analyzing the Arab world," offers a "rationale for collective action--and it
is action with wbich the Arabs must be concemed" (A. Laroui, ne CnSs ofthe Arab btellectuai:
Traaïtioizoalism or HIstonêcism?, translated from French by D. Cammell [Berkeley: University of
Califomia Press, 19761, x).
'"SOM, 'Tazlur Rahmany s Islamic Met hodology," 227.
50
philosophy was different fiom that of many nineteenth-century thinken, who were content
with what little they derived fiom intellectual history and claimed that "they had
understood as much of the intellectual history as it is possible to ~nderstand."'A~~no ther
indication of Rahman's "anti-historicist" view was 'Es own judgment of the position that
he was engaged in analyzing." That is to say, in Adams' estunation, Rahman was not
"reluctant to reflect upon the content and the consequences of the ideas put fonvard by
some of those whom he ~tudied."'~~
A thorough examination of Rahman's works would lead one to discover the manner
in which his historical approach influences his philosophical views. His approach to the
history of Islamic philosophy was based on the study of the lives of individual
philosophers. This rneant that Rahman, in a sense, was forced to analyze the socioeconomic
and political background of the philosopher in question before obtaining a
comprehensive impression of them. His analysis of a particda- aspect of a philosopher's
doctrines was, however, never merely descriptive since he strove always to unveil the truth
behind the thought. Taking the theory of creation as an example, Rahman approached Ibn
SG'S thought in light of the contradiction which seemed to exist in the tenth century
between Greek philosophical thought and Islamic tenets. Having analyzed the socioeconomic
and political conditions that prevailed in Ibn Sina's time, Rahman concluded that
the philosophers' formulations were not motivated by 'pure' philosophical reason, but by
L48~dam"sF,a zl al-Rahman," 266.
L4g~dam'Ts,a zl al-Rahman," 266-7.
51
the fact that Islam demands a fundamental distinction between God and the w ~ r l d . ' ~ ~
One application of this method cm be found in Prophecy Islam, where he
examines the thought of various Muslim philosophers on this subject. Here, Rahman
engages in a discussion of prophetic revelation, a central tenet of Islamic dogma. He traces
the Hellenic sources of the philosophical treatises produced by two of the greatest
philosophical figures in Islam: al-Fiiribbi and Ibn Smi. He begins by outlining the conditions
which existed at their time. Having determined that the debate on the sou1 and its powers
of cognition preoccupied most thinkers of that penod, Rahman examines the process by
which Muslim philosophers adopted Greek theories, elaborates them, refuies them, and
above all, recasts thern.
To obtain a precise understanding of Rahman's methodology of Islamic philosophy,
however, it is best to compare him with other scholars of philosophical thought. Mehdi
Ha'iri Yazdi, for example, applies an analytic approach in his appraisal of the philosophical
tradition in Islam. It is clear that Ha'iri bases his thought on the distinction between
ccknowledge by concept" or conceptualization (aPih @y.sÜIi) and "laiowledge by
presence" (alalCiImd 4u@G?4i5' which, was enunciated for the fist time in Islamic
philosophicd history, by Suhrawad. Frorn this angle, Ha'iri maps the historical
background of philosophy in general and of Islamic philosophy in particular, and explains
how, in Islamic philosophy, the concept of howledge by presence is understood. He begins
15'T'he difference between t hese two types of knowledge is that dCihai- b ugZ "signifies
the priox-ity of an immediate, durationless, intuitive mode of cognition over the temporaliy extended
essentiaiist definitions used as predicative propositions," while aIICiIm al-bpüfi signifies the
Perïpatetic view of "acquired howledge" (Ziai, "Shihab al-Din Suhraward," 438).
his analysis by comparing the epistemological traditions of Plato and Mstotle. Plato held
the view, for example, that "intellectual howledge is an inteilectual reflection by the
human mind of unique, simple, universal, immut able, and immaterial objects." Accordingly,
this type of knowledge is "an inteilectual w'sion of these 'transcendent' ~b j e c t s . " 'O~n~ t he
other hand, Aristotle held to the conception that "there is no identification of 'seeing' and
'knowing,' since knowing is never seeing if there is no intelligible~object to be seen."
Aristotle then proposed the view that "the tme objects of thought exist in sensible forms
and are intellectualized by 'ab~traction'."'~H~a 'iri cornes to the concIusion that Islamic
philosophy provides an ontological foundation for the "intellectual vision" of Plato or the
"abstract ion7' of Aristot le t hrough which d l hurnan knowledge c m be deduced. ' "
Ha7iri nevertheless acknowledges the fact that the history of knowledge by presence
was "pioneered by 'pagan' Neoplatonists st art hg with Plot inus and ending with Proclus
in the West. They originated the notions of 'emanation,' 'apprehension by presence,'
'i11~mination~."T'~h~is tenet was fùrther expounded by al-FikZbi as the "Theory of Divine
lS2~ehdHia 'iri Yazdi, The Pn'ocipes ofEpistemoloyg in IsIamic Poilosophy: f f iow ledge
by Preseace (Albany : S UNY, 1 9 9 2), 6.
5 3 ~ iari', Tbe P.nc@les ofE pistemology, 7-8 .
15'~a'iri~7e P~bcip/esofEpisterno8~-9o-~ ",In principle, the Islamic approach shows that
the two ostensibly contradictory systems of epistemology, the Platonic and the Aristotelian, can
be employed in a simple philosophical fiamework for the purpose of arriving at a satisfactory
solution to the problem of human knowledge. In this regard, Islarnic philosophy maintains that the
mind is constituted by its nature to function in different ways at the same time; being perceptive
of intelligible substances on the one hand and speculative about sensible objects on the other"
(Ha' iri, me Pnnciples of Epistemology, 8 -9).
15%a'iri, 7i5cP'pI' ofEpis&emoloa9y9, . Ha'iri realizes that in Plotinus' and other Neo-
Platonic philosophers' works, one often finds the word "presence" or c'awareness-by-presence." In
this type of philosophy, however, the question of ''why this fonn of awareness should have a seat
in the very reality of an individual self in the first place" was not explicitly probed. It was
53
F o m and God's Knowledge," and by Ibn Sima as the 'Theory of Human Knowledge." For
al-GhâzZli it appears as the "The Treatise on Light" and for Ibn Rushd as the "Theory of
Man's Ultimate Happiness." Knowledge by presence was more fully developed by
philosophers of '-, such as Ibn 'Arabi, who was farned for the doctrine (already referred
to above) known as "unity of being" (wddat al-wujd). In Suhrawardi and Nasr al-Din
d-TUsi the system appears in illuminative philosophy for the fust time in Islamic thought.
Later, this tradition arose in another form that of ccexistentialist" philosophy (a$aIaf alwujU9
in the work of Mulla Sadr& through his methodology of "met a-philosophy" (alhihd
al-mu ta-'Zyd).I s6
Rahman's view of the philosophical tradition in IsIam diverges fiom HaYiri's.T his
divergence can be explained as follows: Rahman employs a historical approach, the latter
an anaiytic, philosophical one. It is tnie that Ha'in also applies a historical approach, but
he remains more focused on tracing the sources of epistemological tradition and on
presenting an Islamic formulation of the subject. On the other hand, Rahman's religious
orientation, particularly his emphasis on the use of the historical approach, influenced his
Suhrawardi who proposed the prime question in the theory of knowledge: "What is the objective
reference of '1' when used in an ordinary statement like '1 think so-and-so,' or '1 do this-and-that'?"
(rra in, The Pnnc~pleso fE pistemology, 24).
L56~a'irTi,h e Prioaples of Epistemology, 10-26. Ha'iri further explains the nature of
S adrz's "met a-philosophy": "it provides a meta-linguistic met hod in philosophy by which
independent decisions on the validity and soundness of al1 philosophical issues and logical questions
- be they Platonic, Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, mystical or religious-- may be made. The process of
decision making can be implemented without becoming involved in the particularities of each of
these systems" (Ha'iri, The Pnnciples of EpistemoIogy, 25). Nasr argues that in Islamic
philosophical tradition, Mdla Sadr: was given the highest title possible, "Sadr al-rnutacalliEn,"
which means "foremost amongst the mutBal/@uI or that group of men who are themselves the elite
amang al1 who seek the laiowledge of things divine" (Nasr, Bdr al-Din ShrTazI: 38-9).
54
interpretation of the philosophical tradition of Islam in a broader way than that of HaYiri.
Equally, in Rahman's works one fhds a historical approach which clearly relates to his
philosophical thought .
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